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I. INTRODUCTION 
A defendant in an environmental case may face both state and 
federal government prosecution, because major federal environmen-
tal statutes are designed to foster concurrent responsibility for their 
enforcement. The leading examples of such statutes are the Clean 
Air Act (CAA),1 the Clean Water Act (CWA),2 the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA),3 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA),4 the current enforcement statutes. These federal stat-
utes typically mandate the establishment of uniform national stan-
dards and encourage the states to seek federal approval from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA) to take over and ad-
minister the programs. Once one of its programs has passed muster 
with the EPA, a state becomes an "approved" state under that 
federal statute. However, these same statutes usually allow the 
federal government to retain the power to enforce sanctions even 
with an approved program of state laws in place. 
Historically, defendants facing multiple prosecutions arising from 
a single transaction may find some relief in the common law doctrines 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel when subsequent suits are 
brought by the same plaintiff or a different party in privity with 
that plaintiff.5 It has been suggested that these doctrines apply with 
equal force and effect in the field of environmental law without any 
particular refinement or distinction. 6 Even a critic of the application 
of collateral estoppel to concurrent enforcement situations concedes 
1 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1988). 
2 Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 33 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1988). 
3 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-ll (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i) (1982 & 
Supp. IV 1986). 
5 Res judicata bars a second suit on a cause of action where there has been a valid final 
judgment on the merits, while collateral estoppel precludes relitigation in a different cause of 
action of issues actually and necessarily determined in a final judgment. Together, these 
doctrines are referred to generically as preclusion doctrines. Montana v. United States, 440 
U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
6 Sive, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Environmental Litigation, 2 ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 928 (1985). 
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that preclusion and related stay and abstention doctrines ought to 
be used by a court in its discretion to avoid jurisdictional strife. 7 
Application of either res judicata or collateral estoppel in a situa-
tion where the state and federal governments have concurrent en-
forcement authority generally depends upon a finding that govern-
ments were in privity with one another. Otherwise, the violator of 
an environmental law is generally in the same position as any other 
person in a federal system. He would be subject to concurrent reg-
ulation by both federal and state authorities, like a bank robber 
whose single act can lead to simultaneous prosecutions in both juris-
dictions. 8 However, the existence of concurrent enforcement author-
ities does not per se prevent application of preclusion principles. 9 
It seems improbable that res judicata, a principle of Roman law, 
and collateral estoppel, a principle of medieval Germanic law, should 
be adopted independently by English law10 and later be combined to 
help shape the development of environmental law in the late twen-
tieth century; but such seems to be the case. 
In environmental case law, res judicata and collateral estoppel can 
occur in four different fact patterns. Perhaps the most obvious of 
these is when the federal government, in the person of the EPA, 
sues a defendant under the same statute and for the same event for 
which it has already been prosecuted by a state. When this occurs 
in the context of one of the previously mentioned joint federal/state 
programs, the action by the EPA is referred to as overfiling. The 
leading overfiling case is United States v. ITT Rayonier,l1 a 1980 
Ninth Circuit case. 
A second fact pattern, a variation of the first, occurs when a state 
takes action under one of these concurrent enforcement statutes, 
but the federal government bases its action on a different statute, 
72 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.26, at 381, § 4.40(B)(d), at 
600-02 (1986). 
8 United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 420 (D. Md. 1985). See generally 18 C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4458, at 503 
(1981 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 18 WRIGHT]. Bank robbery is, of course, a criminal violation. 
For that reason it is not an entirely appropriate example, because dual sovereignty is more 
strictly applied in that context. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1978). 
Although there are criminal penalties in the laws under discussion, see CWA § 309(c), 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982), amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (West Supp. 1988); CAA § 113(c), 
42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1982); RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), this 
Article is primarily concerned with the preclusive effects of civil judgments. See also infra 
note 53 for other aspects of criminal law. 
9 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1980). 
10 Note, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 828 (1952). 
11 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 12 which does not have comparable 
provisions for giving states primary enforcement authority. This 
pattern might also arit:.e when a state acts under one of the concur-
rent enforcement statutes, but the EPA bases its action on portions 
of the same statute which have no provisions for state enforcement, 
such as RCRA Section 7003. 13 Although a number of cases have 
allowed both state and federal recoveries,14 none has specifically 
addressed the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues. These first 
two fact patterns will be referred to collectively as the overfiling 
scenario and are the primary objects of investigation and analysis in 
this Article. 
The two final fact patterns involve successive actions by the fed-
eral government alone. 15 The first one involves multiple suits by the 
EPA against the same defendant to remedy a problem at a single 
site. A complex cleanup of an abandoned hazardous waste site under 
CERCLA presents such an opportunity for multiple suits. Such suits 
can lead to conflict with an aspect of res judicata known as claim 
splitting and are discussed with a synopsis of CERCLA. The final 
fact pattern involves successive EPA prosecutions in different fed-
eral circuit courts of the same defendant for the same issue arising 
at different plant locations of the defendant. While the most narrow 
of all the situations, this one was the subject of a Supreme Court 
case, United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company. 16 It is discussed 
along with other issues that are unique to situations in which the 
United States is a litigant. 
Although there are no reported preclusion cases under RCRA or 
the SDWA, several cases under the CAA and the CWA suggest that 
the EPA's enforcement options may no longer be unfettered once a 
12 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This section is the "imminent hazard" provision 
of RCRA which allows the EPA Administrator to take swift action against imminent and 
substantial endangerments to health or the environment. Similar provisions are found in the 
other media-specific (that is, air, land, or water) statutes discussed herein. 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
15 It has also been suggested that EPA should be estopped by a final judgment in a case 
brought under a citizen suit provision of one of these laws when the EPA passes up its 
opportunity for intervention. See Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control 
Laws, Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063 (1984). No environmental cases 
explore this possibility, and it is generally beyond the scope of this Article, but some of the 
issues it raises will be discussed later under the topic The Federal Government as a Litigant. 
See infra notes 388-415 and accompanying text. 
16 464 U.S. 165 (1984). 
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state has taken final action against a specific polluter for a specific 
incident or transaction. This Article explores the potential applica-
tion of res jUdicata and collateral estoppel principles to environmen-
tal scenarios to determine whether either may be asserted by a 
defendant who has reached "final judgment" in a prior action brought 
against it by a state or the EPA, only to find itself subject to a 
second action brought by the EPA. 
In addition to res judicata and collateral estoppel, other defense 
strategies to concurrent enforcement are explored. Most signifi-
cantly, these other strategies do not require privity between a state 
and the EPA. For example, some of these environmental laws con-
tain statutory language that can give rise to arguments that Con-
gress intended to preclude concurrent enforcement in certain circum-
stances. Even where common law preclusive and statutory 
interpretive arguments fail, successful abstention and discretionary 
stay arguments can yield similar results. 
This Article begins with an overview that will explore the influence 
of statutory enforcement and state power sharing provisions in the 
overfiling scenario. 17 A more detailed examination of the general 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel follows. Because of 
its significance, privity is explored separately, after which a group 
of issues related to the special nature of federal litigation is consid-
ered. Finally, this Article concludes that the preclusion doctrines 
remain viable defenses in overfiling situations, although more than 
the mere fact of an overfiling is required to invoke them. 
II. CONCURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
A. Over filing 
When the EPA exercises its authority to prosecute an alleged 
violator in an approved state that has already initiated its own 
17 Of the seven major environmental laws administered by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), only two will not be discussed directly: the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). TSCA 
is nondelegable to the states by law, whereas FIFRA is run almost entirely by the states. C. 
Wasserman, Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Compliance Monitoring and En-
forcement of Environmental Policies II-I, V-I (undated paper prepared on behalf of The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). Although these facts make it 
unlikely that either statute would be involved in the first overfiling scenario, they are poten-
tially covered by the other three preclusion scenarios described. Because of the EPA's use of 
cooperative agreements with states to delegate otherwise nondelegable statutes or nondeleg-
able portions of mostly delegable statutes, even these two statutes have some possibility of 
falling under the first overfiling scenario. I d. at V-I to V -2. 
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enforcement action for the same requirements against the same 
defendant, this action is known as "overfiling. "18 The EPA's policy 
is that overfiling is appropriate "when the state fails to take timely 
and appropriate action" or when the "state's action is clearly inade-
quate," such as when "the relief requested and penalties to be as-
sessed by the state" do not comport with the EPA's own analysis of 
what is appropriate. 19 The EPA holds that its authority to overfile 
is unfettered and totally within its discretion,20 thus implicity re-
jecting the application of preclusion doctrines to the overfiling situ-
ation. Generally, however, the EPA's policy is to avoid dual enforce-
ment and to exercise its concurrent authority only "following 
unsuccessful, or what it believes to be unsatisfactory, state enforce-
ment actions. "21 
In an exercise of its oversight authority, the EPA established in 
June 1984 a detailed policy framework as a blueprint for state/EPA 
agreements. This framework included oversight criteria to define 
"good performance" by a state and criteria to determine when ov-
erfiling is appropriate. 22 One of the good performance criteria is 
"timely and appropriate enforcement response" by the state, which 
includes: 
(1) A set number of days from detection of a violation to initial 
response; 
18 Wasserman, supra note 17, at V-6. See also Memorandum from A. James Barnes, Deputy 
EPA Administrator, to Regional Administrators 1 (May 19, 1986) [hereinafter Barnes Mem-
orandum], regarding guidance on RCRA overfiling. 
This Article presumes that the most common overfiling scenario is one in which the state 
brings an action against a defendant under state law, and the EPA subsequently brings suit 
under federal law based upon those portions of state law subsumed into federal regulations. 
As a result, the issue of whether or not to apply either res judicata or collateral estoppel will 
be before a federal judge in the EPA suit. 
19 Barnes Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1-2. 
20 Id. at 1; see also In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-0012, slip op. at 5 (EPA May 10, 1985). 
21 T. TRUITT & R. HALL, PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: COURSE MANUAL 268 (1980). 
Where two actions are pursued simultaneously, the first to reach final judgment is entitled to 
res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4404, at 22. Thus, 
where the EPA files suit after the state, but prior to final judgment in state court, a defendant 
'might instead seek a stay or dismissal in federal court under one of several abstention and 
discretionary stay doctrines. See, e.g., United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 745-
51 (D. Del. 1981); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
813-21 (1976); see also Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1126 (E.D. 
Va. 1979); infra notes 413-488 and accompanying text. 
22 EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING REVISED POLICY FRAME-
WORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS 1-2 (Aug. 1986) [hereinafter EPA POL-
ICY STATEMENT]. 
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(2) Adequacy of response, gauged by how expeditiously compli-
ance occurs; 
(3) A set number of days to determine whether compliance has 
been achieved or whether further action is necessary; 
(4) A specific point for determining the need for escalation to 
judicial enforcement; 
(5) Establishment of final physical compliance date; and 
(6) Expeditious physical compliance. 23 
205 
In the absence of good performance by a state, the EPA considers 
itself justified in initiating its own direct enforcement action. If the 
state has already taken enforcement action, the EPA's action would 
be an overfiling. One of the situations specified by the EPA in which 
it might take direct enforcement action in approved states is when 
the "[s]tate enforcement response is not timely and appropriate."24 
This criterion, that is, bad state performance, is defined to include 
situations where: 
(1) The state action is untimely, or, after notification by the EPA, 
the state does not move expeditiously; 
(2) The content of the enforcement action is inappropriate, i.e., 
remedies are inappropriate, compliance schedules are too ex-
tended, or there is no appropriate penalty or other sanction; and 
(3) The state has not assessed a penalty or other appropriate 
sanction. 25 
The specific time frame in which the EPA expects a state to take 
enforcement action varies from statute to statute. 26 A January 1987 
report on the success of this program reported a rate of 75% for 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 46% for 
RCRA, and 22% for CAA.27 The report also noted that there are 
"philosophical differences" between the EPA and the states on the 
overall use of penalties to achieve compliance, perhaps indicating 
that what seems appropriate to the EPA does not necessarily seem 
23 Id. at 11-12. 
24 Id. at 21. 
25 I d. at 22-23. 
26 According to the EPA: 
[I)f a facility were determined to be in significant violation of RCRA, Air, and NPDES 
all on the same day, the State or EPA would be expected to either have returned 
the facility to compliance or taken a formal enforcement action within 120 days for 
Air, 90 days for RCRA, and 180-270 days for NPDES, depending on when during 
the quarter the violation was reported. 
EPA CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TIMELY AND ApPROPRIATE 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE CRITERIA 6 (Jan. 1987). 
27Id. at 1, 12. 
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so to states. 28 A comparison showed that the EPA sought penalties 
in 93% of RCRA and 81 % of CAA cases, while states sought penalties 
in 49% of RCRA and 62% of CAA cases. 29 
While such a detailed oversight policy and the degree of control it 
seeks to impose does not mean that the state and the EPA will be 
inevitably considered alter egos for the application of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, it certainly enhances such an argument. If a 
state must act "expeditiously" after prompting by the EPA and 
impose penalties acceptable to the EPA, and if a given statute gives 
the EPA the authority to see that the state abides by the published 
EPA policy, this control tends to make the state appear less like an 
independent sovereign and more like an agent of the EPA. 
This Article discusses CWA, SDW A, and RCRA first because 
their enforcement schemes bear the most resemblance to one an-
other. They are all based primarily on the initial establishment by 
the federal government of maximum concentrations of pollutants in 
permitted discharges and subsequent establishment of equivalent 
programs by the states. The CAA, by contrast, is based primarily 
on the initial establishment by the federal government of maximum 
concentrations of ambient air pollutants. These concentration levels 
are then implemented by state permit programs that set maximum 
emissions so as to achieve the desired ambient conditions. CERCLA 
resembles the first group in establishing numerical reportable quan-
tities of the substances it covers, but differs from the other statutes 
in having no provisions for delegation of primary enforcement au-
thority to federally approved state counterpart programs. 
B. Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act is the primary statute for dealing with water 
pollution in the United States. 30 Although the present statute can 
trace its roots back to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1948, it did not achieve its present structure until the 1972 amend-
ments and did not take its present name until the 1977 amend-
ments. 31 As now constituted, it seeks to "restore and maintain the 
2B [d. at 12. 
29 [d. at 1, 12. 
30 Trauberman, Compensating Victims o/Toxic Substances: Existing Federal Mechanisms, 
5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18 (1981). 
31 T. TRUITT & R. HALL, supra note 21, at 179. 
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."32 
The issuance of permits to regulate discharges of pollutants into 
navigable waters under Section 402, and the prohibition of unper-
mitted discharges under the enforcement provisions of Section 301, 
are central to achieving this purpose. 
One of the policies enumerated in the CWA is "to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of 
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution ... and to consult 
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this 
chapter. "33 Consistent with this policy, Section 402 allows each state 
to develop a program for issuing discharge permits within its juris-
diction. Section 309 provides for state enforcement. 
Under Section 402(b), the governor of a state desiring to admin-
ister its own program for discharge permits may do so by submitting 
to the Administrator of the EPA (Administrator) a program descrip-
tion under state law and a statement on program authority from the 
chief legal officer of the state. The Administrator shall approve the 
program within ninety days unless he or she finds that it lacks the 
authority to meet the eight criteria set forth in the statute to ensure 
equivalence with the federal program. Approval of the state program 
suspends issuance of federal discharge permits. 34 Thereafter, appli-
cants must comply with the state program. 35 
While approval of a state program might appear to be a functional 
delegation of federal authority to the state, Congress has tried to 
avoid that term, perhaps to forestall the argument that the EPA 
and the state are in privity for the sake of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel under an agency argument. 36 In making its point about 
32 CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 
1988). 
33 CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). 
34 CWA § 402(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (1982), amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c)(1) (West 
Supp. 1988). 
35 Similar provisions exist in CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West Supp. 1988), for application, approval, and withdrawal of state pro-
grams to issue "dredge and fill" permits. This program is not discussed in detail because of 
its similarity and because only one state, Michigan, has availed itself of this opportunity. See 
40 C.F.R. § 233.42 (1987). 
36 W. RODGERS, supra note 9, § 4.26, at 380 n.47; see also Mianus River Preservation 
Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 903-06, 910 (2d Cir. 1976). In Mianus, the Connecticut 
Commissioner of Environmental Protection was held not to be the agent of the EPA Admin-
istrator for the purposes of invoking circuit court jurisdiction under CWA § 509(b)(1)(F), 33 
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (West 
Supp. 1988), for modification of a NPDES permit. The Mianus court noted that, although the 
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delegation, however, Congress concedes that a state program func-
tions "in lieu of" the federal program,37 a fact also relevant to the 
privity argument. 
Although the approved state permit program supplants that of 
the EPA, active federal participation does not end. The CWA re-
quires the state to send the EPA a copy of each permit application 
and notice of every action related to its consideration. 38 The EPA 
can withdraw approval of state programs subsequently found not to 
be administered in accordance with Section 402 if corrective action 
is not taken within ninety days.39 On a less drastic plane, the Ad-
ministrator can veto proposed state permits40 he finds to be "outside 
the guidelines and requirements" of CWA Subchapter IV.41 If the 
state does not resubmit a permit revised to meet the EPA's objec-
tions, or if no hearing on the EPA's action is requested, the EPA 
may issue the permit itself.42 The EPA may, however, waive all or 
part of the notification requirement and limit its veto authority when 
approving a state's program,43 and regularly does so in regard to 
small discharger categories of less than 50,000 gallons per day.44 
Senate had used the word "delegate" in its report, it did not do so with precision. 541 F.2d 
at 905. 
37 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4424, 4479 which provides as follows: 
The conferees wish to emphasize that such a State program [for § 404 discharges] is 
one which is established under State law and which functions in lieu of the Federal 
program. It is not a delegation of Federal authority. This is a point which has been 
widely misunderstood with regard to the permit program under section 402 of the 
Act. That section, after which the Conference substitutes concerning State programs 
for the discharge of dredged or fill material is modeled, also provides for State 
programs which function in lieu of the Federal program and does not involve a 
delegation of Federal authority. 
38 CWA § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1) (1982). 
39 CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (1982). 
40 It has been suggested that collateral estoppel should be applicable where EPA vetoes a 
state permit that has been litigated to finality in the state judicial system. Note, Jurisdiction 
to Review Informal EPA Influence Upon State Decisionmaking Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act: Shell Oil CO. V. Train, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1814, 1821-22 (1979); see 
also Bullwinkel, Environmental Law-The Uneasy Accommodation Between State and Fed-
eral Agencies, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 423, 433 (1976) (discussing the thorough administrative 
review and available judicial review in Illinois that should preclude litigation in the United 
States Court of Appeals). It is difficult to see how such a case would arise factually, given the 
time constraint on the exercise of EPA's veto authority-90 days after notice of the proposed 
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d). 
41 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2). 
42 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4). 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3), (e) (1982). 
44 Interview with David T. Buente, Jr., Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, United 
States Department of Justice (April 7, 1987). 
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In a similar vein, the EPA enforcement authority continues in 
approved states. 45 Section 309(a)(1) permits enforcement by the EPA 
of permits issued by a state if the state does not initiate "appropriate 
enforcement action" within thirty days of notice of a violation from 
the EPA. If permit violations are widespread in a given state, and 
if the EPA believes that this condition is a result of ineffective state 
enforcement, the EPA can declare a period of "federally assumed 
enforcement" and take enforcement action directly without the thirty 
day notice. 46 This provision has never been used, perhaps because 
Section 309(a)(3) also provides authority for the EPA to take en-
forcement action on a state-issued permit without regard to the 
appropriateness of the state action and without a thirty day notice. 47 
In addition, Section 504 authorizes the Administrator to act when-
ever there is evidence of an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to personal health or welfare. 
Because the EPA enforcement in an approved state can be trig-
gered by a lack of "appropriate" state action, this ambiguous stan-
dard can be seen as statutory justification for the previously men-
tioned EPA overfiling policy, at least for actions under the CWA. A 
statutory basis for an action, however, does not necessarily prevent 
the operation of res judicata or collateral estoppel, at least where 
there is no explicit or implicit repeal of those doctrines. 48 
Although the CWA states specifically that devolution of permitting 
authority to the states does not limit the EPA's enforcement au-
thority, this condonation of overfiling, by itself, may not preempt 
common law res judicata and collateral estoppel principles either. 49 
45 "Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator to 
take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title." 33 U. S. C. § 1342(i) (1982). 
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (1982). 
47 Buente, supra note 44; Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to 
Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator, at 9 n.8. (May 9, 1986) (regarding the effect on EPA 
enforcement of enforcement action taken by state with approved RCRA program). While it 
might seem odd that the statute, in a single subsection, requires the EPA to wait 30 days 
after giving notice to an approved state and gives the EPA authority to act without giving 
notice, such is the language of the statute and the interpretation of at least one court. See 
United States v. City of Colorado Springs, 455 F. Supp. 1364, 1366-67 (D. Colo. 1978). But 
see United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 740 (D. Del. 1981) (interpreting Congress' 
intent that such authority be used "with restraint"). 
48 See infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text. 
49 Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to any type of federal enforcement action that 
meets the necessary factual conditions. In the overfiling scenario, these conditions are only 
met when the state takes enforcement action first, because there is no statutory language or 
case law suggesting that a state might overfile on EPA. Even overfiling by the EPA is not 
an event considered explicitly in CWA Sections 309 or 402. Thus, the language of those 
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Moreover, other provisions, which bear a suspicious resemblance to 
res judicata, explicitly limit the enforcement authority of the EPA 
to bring successive (or simultaneous) actions for the same event. 
Section 311(b)(6)(E), which covers discharges of oils and hazardous 
substances, prohibits assessment of civil penalties under both Sec-
tion 311 and Section 309 for the same discharge. 50 One might argue 
that this impliedly repeals other applications of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel by omission, or that, since it appTIes only to 
successive federal actions, it is irrelevant to federal/state actions 
except to show that res judicata principles are not inherently inimical 
to the enforcement scheme under the CW A. Perhaps this subsection 
only reinforces the notion that the meaning of the CWA is not always 
clear. 51 
If the arguments on the relevance of Section 311(b)(6)(E) have any 
merit, they are probably also applicable to the 1987 amendment to 
the CWA,52 which added expanded provisions to CWA Section 309. 
The criminal penalties provision of Section 309(c)53 now provides 
that, for its purposes, "a single operational upset which leads to 
simultaneous violations of more than one pollutant parameter shall 
be treated as a single violation."54 The Section 309(d) provision for 
civil penalties had identical language added. 55 
The same amendment added to Section 309(g) a new provision for 
administrative penalties. This provision contained the limitation that 
a violator being prosecuted diligently under it by the EPA, Secretary 
of the Army, or a state under a comparable law, or against whom a 
final order had been issued by any of those and the fine paid, could 
not be subjected to civil actions under Section 309(d), Section 311(b), 
sections cannot expressly repeal the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel to the 
overfiling scenario. See infra notes 371-77 and accompanying text. 
50 This provision was added by the 1978 amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-576, § 311(b)(6)(E), 92 Stat. 2467, 2469 (1978). Its legislative history, 
however, is unenlightening. See H.R. REP. No. 1097, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Redwood City, Cal., 640 F.2d 963, 969 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(citing Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1162 (2d Cir. 1978». 
52 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). 
53 Successive criminal prosecutions for the same act raise-the possibility of application of 
another doctrine--double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is an element of the fifth amendment and 
most state constitutions. It neither supplants nor abrogates res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
These doctrines take a broader view of what constitutes a single offense, and may be available 
when the prohibition on double jeopardy is not. On the other hand, double jeopardy is available 
in the absence of a judgment, while these doctrines are not. Annotation, Res Judicata---
Criminal Cases, 9 A.L.R. 3d 203, 220-24 (1966 & Supp. 1988). 
54 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 44. 
55 See id. at 45-46. 
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or Section 505 (citizen suits).56 These specific provisions indicate that 
Congress is taking an increasingly broad view of what constitutes a 
single cause of action under the CWA, and an equally dim view of 
redundant enforcement actions. 
CWA enforcement provisions make clear that the EPA exercises 
much influence over states with approved programs, in spite of a 
savings provision for state authority. 57 While the CWA's policy may 
be to recognize that primary enforcement authority rests in the 
states, the Act also gives the EPA the tools necessary to ensure 
that the exercise of the states' authority is consistent with the EPA's 
view of the Act. First of all, state programs must provide protection 
equivalent to the EPA's program to be approved. 58 Even when a 
state has its own program, the EPA can still veto individual permits 
and issue permits more to its liking. If a state steps too far out of 
line, the entire state program can be put on hold until corrections 
are made. If a state does not take "appropriate" action against a 
polluter, it can suffer the embarrassment of an overfiling. If a state 
becomes too lax in the eyes of the EPA, it can suffer the indignity 
of federally assumed enforcement. If one can assume that there are 
economic advantages driving a state to achieve and retain approved 
status, the EPA's ability to influence state action is great indeed. 59 
C. Safe Drinking Water Act 
Congress passed the SDWA in 1974 to deal with perceived wide-
spread contamination of drinking water with synthetic organic chem-
icals. 60 The SDWA instituted two different regulatory programs that 
the states can assume: one establishing numerical drinking water 
standards for public water systems and one regulating underground 
injections. 
56 [d. at 48. 
57 CWA § 510,33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982). 
58 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(I)(A), (2)(A) (1982). 
59 The fact that there is some advantage to having an approved program can be seen from 
the number of states that have achieved that status. Thirty-eight states and one territory 
were recently reported as having approved programs under section 402. 52 Fed. Reg. 27,579 
(1987). 
The statutory power to rescind approval of a program previously delegated to a state may 
be less awesome than it appears, however, because of political realities. The EPA recently 
abandoned efforts to withdraw North Carolina's RCRA authority after a firestorm of protests. 
EPA Postpones North Carolina Hearing; Final Policy on RCRA Withdrawal Yet to Come, 
19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 738--39 (1988). 
60 Durenberger, Revising the Drinking Water Law, EPA JOURNAL, Sept. 1986, at 4; T. 
TRUITT & R. HALL, supra note 21, at 422. 
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Congress' plan for the drinking water program was that the EPA 
would establish national drinking water standards and the states 
would monitor the quality of water delivered to consumers by public 
water systems and take enforcement action when necessary.61 A 
state can achieve primary enforcement responsibility upon a finding 
by the Administrator that its regulations meet criteria set forth in 
Section 1413(a), including adequate inspection, monitoring, and en-
forcement. 62 Upon approval, the state is deemed to have "primary 
enforcement responsibility. "63 The EPA retains the authority under 
Section 1413(b)(1), however, to determine whether a state is no 
longer meeting the criteria and presumably no longer has enforce-
ment authority. 64 
Primary enforcement responsibility gives the state authority to 
grant variances under Section 1415 from the EPA drinking water 
regulations. 65 Primary enforcement responsibility also gives the 
state the authority to grant an exemption under Section 1416 from 
the EPA regulations for compelling factors, including economic fac-
tors. The state must give the EPA prompt notification of both 
variances66 and exemptions67 the state grants. The EPA can modify 
state-granted variances and exemptions if the EPA finds that the 
state has abused its discretion in a substantial number of instances. 68 
The EPA retains authority to enforce the drinking water regula-
tions through administrative orders and civil court actions in states 
61 Durenberger, supra note 60, at 4. A public water system is defined by SDWA § 1401, 42 
U.S.C. § 300(0(4) (1982), to be a public system of piped water for human consumption with 
at least 15 service connections or regular service to at least 25 people. SDWA § 1412, 42 
U.S.C. § 300g-1 (1982 & SUpp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-1 (West SUpp. 1988), 
provides authority for promulgation of drinking water regulations by the EPA. By 1986, 
regulatory limits had been set for only 22 contaminants, but the 1986 amendments required 
the establishment of standards for 83 named contaminants within three years. See Safe 
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 101, 100 Stat. 642, 643 (1986). 
62 All but two states have done so. Only the states of Indiana and Wyoming, plus the District 
of Columbia, do not have primary enforcement responsibility. See Who Keeps Your Drinking 
Water Safe?, EPA JOURNAL, Sept. 1986, at 21. 
63 SDWA § 1413(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (1982 & SUpp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300g-2(a) (West SUpp. 1988). 
64 See SDWA § 1413(b)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(b)(I) (1982). 
65 See SDWA § 1415, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300g-4 (West SUpp. 1988). 
66 SDWA § 1415(a)(I)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(1)(C) (1982). 
67 SDWA § 1416(c), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5(c) (1982). 
68 The provision for variances is at SDWA § 1415(a)(I)(G)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4(a)(I)(G)(i) 
(1982); and the provision for exceptions is at SDWA § 1416(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-
5(d)(2)(A) (1982). While each provision might appear to give the EPA substantially less 
oversight than under the CWA, which allows the EPA to veto permits on a case by case basis 
before they become final, waiver by the EPA of its CWA veto authority may result in little 
difference in practice. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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with primary enforcement authority, but must first give a thirty day 
notice to the state and the water system. 69 The EPA is required to 
act if the state does not commence appropriate enforcement action 
within that period. 70 Unlike the situation under the CWA, under the 
SDWA the EPA may act only if the state fails to do so or if the 
state's action is ineffective.71 As restrictive of the EPA's discretion 
as this language is, this provision was actually more restrictive 
before the SDWA amendments in 1986. 72 Even where a court agrees 
with the EPA that a state's action has not been appropriate and the 
statute specifically contemplates overfiling, a defendant might argue 
that relitigation of specific issues already decided in the state case 
ought to be precluded under collateral estoppel if the relationship 
between the state and the EPA is one of privity under the SDWA. 
In response, the EPA might, however, seek to preclude relitigation 
of some issue decided favorably to its interests in the first case by 
asserting nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the defen-
dant. 73 
The SDWA also has a savings provision for state authority, allow-
ing adoption or enforcement of any state drinking water law or 
regulation. 74 Interestingly, this provision expressly provides that 
compliance with such a state law or regulation that is not part of the 
EPA-approved state program will not relieve any requirement for 
compliance under the SDWA. This provision seems to preclude any 
arguments for the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel 
to any final judgments resulting from such state laws. One is left to 
wonder what effect Congress intended for final judgments resulting 
from state laws enacted pursuant to the SDW A and approved by 
the EPA. At least to the extent that state enforcement actions 
leading to those judgments can be deemed "appropriate," it seems 
that Congress intended for the EPA to stay its hand. Thus, a state's 
action under the EPA-approved portion of its SDWA program will 
69 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1), (b). 
70 See SDWA § 1414(a)(1)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A), (B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1988). 
71 United States v. Price, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21047, 21056 n.7 (D.N.J. 
1981). 
72 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 202, 100 Stat. 642, 
654 (1986). The former provision involved a cumbersome process with multiple deadlines and 
a specific finding that the "State abused its discretion in carrying out primary enforcement 
responsibility." 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1982). The new provision was designed to 
streamline the process rather than eliminate the requirement that the EPA enforcement 
authority be conditioned upon lack of appropriate state action. See generally S. R.EP. No. 56, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1986). 
73 See infra note 275 for a discussion of mutuality. 
74 See SDWA § 1414(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(e) (1982). 
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have more preclusive effect on the EPA than an action under the 
unapproved portions of its law, a result consistent with sovereignty 
considerations. An enforcement action by a state under its ordinary 
laws is a purer exercise of sovereignty, whereas, for the approved 
laws, Congress apparently views the state and the EPA as alternate 
enforcers of a single scheme. 
Similarly, the plan for the underground injection control (DIC) 
program requires the EPA to establish minimum requirements for 
effective state programs to protect drinking water supplies from 
underground injections. 75 State programs must require permits for 
underground injections and prevent underground injections of pol-
lutants which endanger drinking water supplies. 76 States determined 
by the EPA to need such a program to protect their groundwater 
are required to apply to the Administrator for approval, and, upon 
obtaining it, acquire primary enforcement responsibility.77 Such au-
thority may be withdrawn only after opportunity for a public hear-
ing. 78 
As with the drinking water program, the EPA retains authority 
to enforce the DIC program in states with primary enforcement 
authority and is required to take action on violations that continue 
for thirty days after notice to the state and violator if the state does 
not take "appropriate enforcement action. "79 The EPA can take ad-
ministrative or civil action and can also take criminal action for willful 
violations. 80 There are no analogous provisions for variances or ex-
emptions, but there is a savings provision similar to that of the 
drinking water program for other state laws not included in the 
approved program. 81 The impact of this provision on res judicata and 
collateral estoppel is also similar to that described above for the 
drinking water program. 
In addition to the authority to enforce the DIC program, the EPA 
retains the authority to act against imminent endangerments to 
health. 82 The Administrator is required to consult with state author-
75 SDWA § 1421(b)(l), 42 v.s.c. § 300h(b)(I) (1982). 
76 T. TRUITT & R. HALL, supra note 21, at 423. 
77 See SDWA § 1422(b)(I)(A), (b)(3), 42 V.S.C. § 300h-l(b)(I)(A), (b)(3) (1982). 
78 See SDWA § 1422(b)(3), (4), 42 V.S.C. § 300h-l(b)(3), (4) (1982). 
79 SDWA § 1423(a)(1), 42 V.S.C. § 300h-2(a)(I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 
V.S.C.A. 300h-2(a)(I) (West Supp. 1988). 
80 SDWA § 1423(a)(I), (b)(2), 42 V.S.C. § 300h-2(a)(I), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 
42 V.S.C.A. § 300h-2(a)(1), (b) (West Supp. 1988). 
81 SDWA § 1423(d), 42 V.S.C. § 300h-l(d) (1982). 
82 SDWA § 1431(a), 42 V.S.C. § 300i(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 V.S.C.A. 
§ 300i(a) (West Supp. 1988). 
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ities only "to the extent he determines to be practicable"83 in exe-
cuting this authority, thus confirming the continuing ability of the 
EPA to act independently of the state. 
In conclusion, the SDWA enforcement programs are similar to 
those of the CWA, with perhaps more emphasis on state primacy. 
The statute presents the same opportunity for the EPA overfiling, 
includes an "appropriateness" standard for state enforcement ac-
tions, and is ambiguous as to the effect of prior state action under 
its approved program. It is not ambiguous, however, with regard to 
prior state actions under other water laws. These state laws outside 
the approved program do not have an effect equivalent to res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel. Perhaps by omission one can infer that 
prior state enforcement action under approved portions of a state 
program would have preclusive effect on subsequent EPA actions, 
at least to the extent that the state actions were "appropriate." 
Whether or not res judicata and collateral estoppel could be applied 
in an overfiling situation might well turn on how much discretion a 
court would allow the EPA in its determination that a given state 
action was inappropriate. That no such issue has yet arisen in a 
reported case is not surprising, given the dearth of enforcement 
action under the SDWA at all levels. 84 
D. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
RCRA Subtitle C establishes a comprehensive program for the 
control of hazardous wastes from the time of their generation until 
their ultimate disposal. 85 The federal government through the EPA 
is empowered and required to identify and list hazardous wastes86 
and to establish standards for generators,87 transporters,88 and own-
ers and operators of facilities to treat, store, and dispose89 of haz-
ardous wastes. RCRA also requires a federal permit program for 
owners or operators of new or existing treatment, storage, or dis-
83 Id. 
84 Durenberger, supra note 60, at 5 (citing a 1981 GAO compliance study). 
85 See RCRA §§ 3001--3019, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6939 (West Supp. 1988). 
86 42 U.S.C. § 6921; 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (1987). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 6922; 40 C.F.R. pt. 262 (1987). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 6923; 40 C.F.R. pt. 263 (1987). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 6924; 40 C.F.R. pt. 265 (1987). The regulations at 40 C.F.R. part 265 apply 
to interim status permits, that is, to those applicable to facilities already in existence on the 
effective date of statutory or regulatory requirements that have not yet obtained final status, 
while the regulations at 40 C.F.R. part 264 apply to final permits. 
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posal facilities. 90 Finally, the EPA is required to promulgate guide-
lines for development of comparable state programs. 91 
Any state desiring to administer and enforce its own hazardous 
waste program can apply to the Administrator under guidelines 
promulgated by the EPA. Such proposed programs must be "equiv-
alent to the Federal program" of the EPA, be "consistent with 
Federal or State programs applicable in other States," and "provide 
adequate enforcement of compliance."92 The approved portions of a 
state's proposed program then become the federal law applicable in 
that state and are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 93 
Congress described the system created by RCRA as a "Federal-
State partnership" for the control of hazardous wastes. 94 Once a 
program has been established by a state and approved by the EPA, 
that state then takes over primary responsibility for issuance of 
permits and enforcement. 96 The EPA becomes, in effect, a senior 
partner with oversight responsibility and power to withdraw state 
authority for cause. 96 The EPA also has explicit continuing authority 
to take enforcement action on its own, even if the state has an 
approved program that supplants the federal program in that state. 97 
In addition, the EPA retains its authority to act against "imminent 
and substantial endangerments to health or the environment. "98 
Once a state's program is approved by the EPA, that state is 
authorized to carry out such a program in lieu of the federal pro-
90 42 U.S.C. § 6925; 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (1987). 
91 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). 
93 Only the states of Delaware and Montana have had the approved portions of their state 
programs incorporated by reference and made a part of the hazardous waste management 
program through codification in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 272.401, 
272.1351 (1987). What action the' EPA can legally take in the other forty states with approved 
programs but without such promulgations is problematic. To date, no defendant has raised 
this lack of codification as an issue in an overfiling case. Telephone interview with Susan 
Absher, Chief of Oversight, State Programs Branch, Office of Solid Wastes, EPA (Mar. 3, 
1987). 
94 RCRA § 1003(a)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6902(a)(7) (West Supp. 1988), lists one of the objectives of the statute as "establishing a 
viable Federal-State partnership to carry out the purposes of this chapter and insuring that 
the Administrator will . . . give a high priority to assisting and cooperating with states in 
obtaining full authorization of State programs . . . ." 
96 See RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6926(b) (West Supp. 1988). 
96 See RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1982). 
97 See RCRA § 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
98 RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6973(a) (West Supp. 1988). 
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gram. 99 Thereafter, a state's action under its hazardous waste pro-
gram has the same force and effect as the EPA's action under the 
federal program. lOO However broad the powers of a state with an 
approved program, the "in lieu of" language has not been interpreted 
in a way that seriously disables the continuing authority of the EPA. 
Citing this explicit continuing enforcement authority, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that an approved state program does not entirely 
preempt the EPA. 101 Rather, the EPA continues to have the au-
thority to issue orders requiring owners and operators to monitor, 
test, analyze, and report results. 102 Although the court's language 
holds forth the possibility of a partial preemption, it does not explain 
its scope. 103 
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, one administrative court held 
that Congress did intend that the EPA be precluded from taking 
enforcement action in an approved state when the state had already 
taken adequate enforcement action itself on the same alleged viola-
tion. In the Matter of BKK Corporation involved the operation of a 
hazardous waste facility in California that had been authorized to 
operate its own hazardous waste program. 104 The EPA filed an ad-
ministrative complaint against BKK after BKK had entered into a 
comprehensive and objectively reasonable settlement agreement 
with the state. 105 Citing the legislative history of RCRA and the "in 
lieu of" and "same force and effect" language in the statute, the 
administrative law judge concluded that, in this situation, the EPA 
was precluded from overfiling. 106 The judge reasoned that to decide 
otherwise would eliminate any reason for a defendant to negotiate 
seriously with a state. 107 On appeal, the Chief Judicial Officer re-
jected the EPA's claim of "unfettered" enforcement authority. In-
stead, he held that the state's action was reasonable and appropriate 
and that to allow the EPA to seek double penalties would undermine 
the authority granted to states in RCRA.108 
99 42 u.s.C. § 6926(b). 
100 RCRA § 3006(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
101 Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20866,20867-68 (9th Cir. 1986). 
102Id. 
103 See id. at 20868. 
104 See In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-0012, slip op. at 2 (EPA Apr. 13, 1984). 
105 See id. at 9. The agreement obligated BKK to spend $1,306,000, commit to a firm work 
schedule, and submit to daily supervision under the state's authority. Id. 
106 See id. at 1, 25. 
l07Id. at 34-35. 
108 In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-0012, slip op. at 7-10 (EPA May 10, 1985). Res judicata 
was technically inapplicable because the state action was embodied in an informal settlement 
agreement without judicial approval. Id. at 9 n.9. 
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On an appeal by the EPA for reconsideration, the precedential 
effect of these two holdings-that the EPA action could be precluded 
by prior state action-evaporated. The EPA Administrator, noting 
that the EPA was no longer challenging the previous findings that 
the state's actions were reasonable and appropriate, dismissed the 
original complaint by the EPA, vacated the two administrative de-
cisions, and ruled that they would have no precedential effect. 109 An 
additional fact tending to limit the circumstances under which the 
issue might arise again is the previously discussed EPA overfiling 
policy,l1O implemented after the BKK complaint was filed,111 which 
restricts the EPA overfilings to situations where state action has 
not been timely or appropriate. As long as the EPA adheres to such 
a policy, it should not matter whether the restriction is self-imposed 
or required by the language of RCRA or any other statute. In no 
reported case has a judge considered such a statutory interpretation 
of RCRA, although an attempt to argue for a similar interpretation 
of the CAA was unsuccessful. 112 
In spite of the Administrator's action in BKK, it still may be 
possible to argue that the EPA policy embodies a statutory standard 
precluding subsequent EPA action as long as the state's prior action 
is adequate by some objective standard. Even the defendant, BKK, 
conceded that the EPA could "step in" when state action was "in-
adequate. "113 At the very least, the language of RCRA seems to 
open the door to judicial scrutiny of the EPA overfilings based on 
determinations that certain state actions are inadequate, using the 
standards of the Administrative Procedures Act. 114 It remains to be 
seen just what facts would allow a judge to overrule a finding by the 
EPA, because lack of "adequacy" as defined by the EPA is far from 
an objective standard. Presumably, the EPA would be entitled to a 
great deal of deference, as it is elsewhere in environmental law. 1l5 
109 In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-00l2, slip op. at 2,4 (EPA Oct. 23, 1985). 
110 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4404, at 22. 
111 In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-00l2, RCRA-V-W-85-002, slip op. at 11 n.14 (EPA May 10, 
1985). 
112 See United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 419 n.20 (D. Md. 1985). The issue 
was also raised in a subsequent administrative case under RCRA, but the administrative law 
judge ruled that the state action was inadequate because it could not obtain meaningful 
compliance from the defendant within a reasonable period of time. EPA v. Cyclops Corp., 
No. RCRA-V-W-85-R-002, slip op. at 7 (EPA Sept. 24, 1985). 
113 In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-00l2, RCRA(3008)84-5, slip op. at 10 n.ll (EPA May 10, 
1985). 
114 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
115 E.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), 470 
U.S. 116, 126 (1983) ("We should defer to [EPA's] view unless the legislative history or the 
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This deference is still limited, however, by a reviewing court's power 
to ensure consistency with statutory mandates and congressional 
policy. 116 
In exploring the continued value of the BKK defense, the language 
of the statute should be instructive, but it is not. The only specifically 
stated constraint placed on the EPA when taking enforcement action 
in a state with an approved RCRA program is that the Administrator 
must first give notice to the state. 117 This provision clearly preserves 
the right of the EPA to take enforcement action in authorized states, 
but just as clearly gives some deference to states through the notice 
requirement while not addressing the effect of a prior enforcement 
action taken by the state. Neither this provision nor any other 
specifically refers to overfiling, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
RCRA's legislative history also makes no reference to overfiling, 
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. As originally enacted, RCRA 
required the Administrator to give the state a thirty day notice 
before commencing an enforcement action. 118 This thirty day period 
was designed to encourage corrective action by continuous emitters 
but was eliminated in 1980 to make it easier to prosecute midnight 
dumpers and other single occurrences. 119 Neither the legislative his-
tory of the original language nor that of the new language evidence 
any explicit consideration of the overfiling situation. 
purpose and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress. "); 
see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978) ("the role 
of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration of environmental factors 
is a limited one"). 
116 See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 
U.S. 89, 97 (1983). 
117 RCRA § 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (quoting NLRB v. 
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965)). RCRA § 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(2), provides: 
In the case of a violation of any requirement of this subchapter where such violation 
occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a hazardous waste program under 
section 3006 [§ 6926 of Title 42], the Administrator shall give notice to the State in 
which such violation has occurred prior to issuing an order or commencing a civil 
action under this section. 
RCRA § 3008(a)(2), 42 U.S.C § 6928(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
Although this Article concerns the hazardous waste portion of RCRA, Subtitle C, it should 
be noted that comparable notice and "in lieu of" provisions can be found respectively in 
sections 9006(a)(2) and 9004(e) for state programs under the underground storage tank law of 
Subtitle I. 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991e(c) 
(West Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6991c(d)(2) (West Supp. 1988). 
118 Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3008(a)(2), 90 Stat. 2795, 2811 (1976). 
119 Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 13, 94 Stat. 2334, 
2339-40 (1980); see also S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5019, 5022. 
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Thus, both the language of RCRA and its legislative history are 
silent on the issue of overfiling. The law is also silent on the appli-
cation of res judicata and collateral estoppel to overfilings. Prior 
notice to the state is a precondition to all filings by the EPA in 
authorized states, whether or not the state has contemplated, initi-
ated, or completed action on its own. The law makes no mention of 
overfilings as a separate subcategory of filings and places no addi-
tional restrictions on them. On its face, then, the statute seems to 
leave the decision on overfiling to the discretion of the Administrator. 
At the same time, it seems to leave to the courts by default the 
decision on application of res jUdicata and collateral estoppel. 
Although the EPA Office of General Counsel continues to insist 
that the language of RCRA affords the Administrator "complete 
prosecutorial discretion, "120 RCRA does not explicitly preempt com-
mon law res judicata and collateral estoppel. There is no inherent 
contradiction in this, however, because res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are affirmative defenses and do not technically limit a pros-
ecutor's discretion, although they can have a devastating effect on 
the prosecution's success. 
Ironically, the BKK argument-that the language of RCRA 
preempts EPA overfiling when there has been prior adequate state 
action-may be at odds with arguments that the EPA and the states 
are in privity for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes. The 
BKK argument depends on independent preemptive state action, 
whereas privity, in at least one of its forms, depends upon a finding 
of the EPA control over the state. While theoretically a defendant 
might be able to make both arguments in the alternative, it is 
unlikely that the facts of a given case would support arguments for 
both independent and subservient state action. It may be better 
defensive strategy to make only the argument with the best chance 
for success on the particular facts of a given case. 
E. Clean Air Act 
The CAA is the major federal legislative effort to deal with air 
pollution from both mobile and stationary sources. The law creates 
a program recognizing the primary responsibility of states for reg-
ulation of stationary sources,121 while establishing federal preemp-
120 Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to Lee M. Thomas, EPA 
Administrator, at 1 (May 9, 1986) (regarding effect on EPA enforcement of enforcement action 
taken by state with approved RCRA program). 
121 CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1982). 
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tion in the regulation of mobile sources. 122 Thus, the portions of the 
Act relating to stationary sources is of primary importance in the 
overfiling analysis. The federal role in stationary source regulation 
is to establish uniform national standards for the concentration of 
criteria pollutants in the ambient air, called national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQS). NAAQS are achieved in each state 
through the implementation of a state implementation plan (SIP). 
The N AAQS are used as the basis for establishing emission limits 
in individual permits issued to sources under the SIP. 
The CAA differs markedly from the other statutes discussed here 
because the centerpiece of the program, the establishment of 
NAAQS, lacks any enforceable provisions at the federal level in the 
absence of an approved state program. Not until the EPA has ap-
proved an SIP for a state is there any mechanism to enforce the 
federally established standards. As a result, there is no federal 
NAAQS program to be delegated to the states. 
Apart from the NAAQS and the SIP, however, the CAA estab-
lished four programs under the Act that are enforceable by the 
federal government before the EPA approves corresponding state 
programs, just as under the other statutes. These programs are the 
new source performance standards (NSPS) in Section 111 of the Act, 
the national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NES-
HAPS) in Section 112, noncompliance penalties for stationary 
sources in Section 120, and the program for prevention of significant 
deterioration (PSD) in Sections 160-169. 123 States can carry out these 
programs as well as the SIP by submitting an adequate procedure 
to the EPA and obtaining its approval. 124 In the case of a PSD 
program, a state must revise its SIP and get the EPA approval of 
the new provisions. 125 The EPA's authority to enforce the provisions 
is retained in approved states. 126 
122 CAA §§ 209(a), 233, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a), 7573 (1982). There is, however, a waiver 
provision in section 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (1982), that allows California to set standards 
for vehicles. 
123 Miller, Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW II 329 (A. 
Reitze ed. 1987). 
124 See CAA §§ l11(c)(l), 112(d)(1), 120(a)(1)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(1), 7412(d)(1), 
7420(a)(1)(B)(i) (1982). 
125 See id. Interestingly, the statute refers to this transfer of authority to the states for the 
first three CAA programs as a delegation, the very term that was studiously avoided under 
the CWA. See id. The considered avoidance of this word in the CWA may indicate that, by 
using it in the CAA, Congress did intend that the EPA would be precluded by prior state 
action. See supra note 37. 
126 CAA §§ 111(c)(2), 112(d)(2), 120(a)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(2), 7412(d)(2), 
7420(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1982). 
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Although states have some latitude in deciding to take over the 
four preceding programs, promulgation of an SIP is hardly a vol-
untary act on the part of a state. According to the CAA, each state 
"shall" adopt and submit a plan within nine months after an initial 
promulgation or revision of a N AAQS. 127 Of the numerous provisions 
to encourage or force state acquiescence, the strongest is probably 
the provision that allows the EPA itself to promulgate an SIP for a 
state that fails or refuses to do SO.128 It is no surprise, then, that all 
states have SIPs. 129 
In order for a state to obtain the EPA approval for its SIP, the 
SIP must meet detailed and lengthy requirements specified in the 
Act. 130 Of primary concern here is the requirement of Section 
llO(a)(2)(D) that an SIP include a program to provide for the en-
forcement of emission limitations and regulation of the modification, 
construction, and operation of any stationary source. 131 By dictating 
the specifics of an enforcement program and limiting a state's en-
forcement discretion, the line between the EPA and its state coun-
terpart is blurred and leads to the argument that the two are in 
privity by virtue of the EPA's strong influence. Further strength-
ening the EPA influence over the state program is the fact that 
courts have accorded the EPA wide latitude in the approval or 
disapproval of SIPs. 132 
In addition to influence over programs, the EPA can enforce the 
requirements of an SIP by first giving notice to the state and the 
violator. Any violation extending beyond the thirtieth day after 
notice can be enforced by an administrative order or a civil judicial 
action. 133 No notice is required before direct federal enforcement of 
the other programs mentioned above that are enforceable without 
being incorporated into the SIP.134 As with the CWA, widespread 
127 CAA § 110(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(I) (1982). 
128 CAA § 110(c)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(c)(l) (1982). 
129 Approved SIPs are reprinted at 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.50-52.2900 (1987). 
130 CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (1982). This section, which embodies the primary list 
of requirements, contains eleven paragraphs of specifics, while other programs in the Act 
require additional details in the SIP. For example, in order to obtain an extension to the 
deadline for compliance with the NAAQS for photochemical oxidants or carbon monoxide, the 
SIP must be revised to comply with the eleven requirements of section 172, 42 U. S. C. § 7502 
(1982), as well. 
131 CAA § 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(D) (1982). 
132 See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. EPA, 696 F.2d 169, 173 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Steel Corp. v. EPA, 633 F.2d 671, 673 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally 1 W. RODGERS, 
supra note 7, § 3.10, at 259. 
133 CAA § 113(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(l) (1982). 
134 CAA § 113(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (1982). 
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violations of an SIP can lead to a period of "federally assumed 
enforcement" during which the thirty day notice is not required. 135 
Finally, as with the other statutes, the EPA has independent au-
thority to bring suit immediately to deal with an "imminent and 
substantial endangerment. "136 
Unlike the SDWA and the ambivalent provisions of the CWA, the 
EPA enforcement under the CAA is not presently explicitly predi-
cated upon a lack of appropriate state action. Prior to the 1970 CAA 
Amendments, the Air Quality Act of 1967 permitted federal enforce-
ment only where the state had failed "to take reasonable action to 
enforce such standards. "137 The repeal of this provisionl38 was cited 
in a district court opinion for the proposition that Congress intended 
to eliminate bars to federal enforcement from prior state action while 
another opinion cited the new language for its holding. 139 Both of 
these cases, however, involved situations where there was no final 
state judicial action and the defendants were arguing for abstention 
by the federal judge. Another district court reached the same con-
clusion in a factually similar case based upon a general reading of 
the statute. The judge was simply unwilling to accept any nullifica-
tion of federal enforcement authority by a state action. 140 
In addition to the approval of delegated programs, the CAA has 
provisions giving the EPA control over state enforcement that do 
not have counterparts in other statutes. Delayed compliance orders, 
which may be issued by the states to sources that are not able to 
comply immediately, can be voided by the EPA if they pertain to a 
non-major source. In addition, these orders are not effective until 
the EPA validates them in the case of a major source. 141 Moreover, 
the EPA can void a state noncompliance penalty under Section 120 
135 CAA § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (1982). 
136 CAA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1982). 
137 Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c)(4), 81 Stat. 485, 493 (1967) (repealed 1977). 
138 See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, 112-13, 133, 146, 163 (Comm. 
Print 1974). 
139 See United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697,1700 
(N.D. Iowa 1984); see also United States v. Chevron, No. EP-80-CA-265, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. 
Tex. June 10, 1983) (ruling on defendant's abstention motion). Lehigh mentions the repeal, 
but cites Chevron, which does not. Lehigh, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1700. 
140 United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Md. 1985). The same district 
court held in an earlier case that an agreement with the state to a compliance schedule did 
not insulate the defendant from a federal enforcement action, but would be considered in 
determining the amount of the civil penalty to be levied. United States v. Harford Sands, 
Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Md. 1983). 
141 CAA § 113(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) 
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if it objects to the state's assessment.142 All in all, it appears that a 
state enforcement program under the CAA has less independence 
from the EPA than under other statutes, enhancing the argument 
that actions of the state ought to be considered actions of EPA under 
a res judicata or collateral estoppel analysis. 
Although no case directly addresses the effect of the EPA control 
over state enforcement, an early Sixth Circuit CAA case addressed 
the issue of res judicata in a footnote: 
It would seem to us that the court which first acquired jurisdic-
tion of enforcement proceedings would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to proceed to determine the litigation, and its judgment 
would be res judicata of the issues litigated. In view of the fact 
that both federal and state courts acquire jurisdiction by a single 
Act of Congress, we do not think that Congress ever intended 
that the parties defendant to enforcement proceedings would be 
subject to double penalties, i.e., penalties in each jurisdiction. 143 
This focus on a single statutory construct is probably enhanced by 
the fact that the Act is generally silent as to its intended effect on 
mUltiple prosecutions. In addition, the CAA specifically states that 
actions under Section 120 are to "be in addition to any other permits, 
orders, payments, sanctions, or other requirements established un-
der this chapter, and shall in no way affect any civil or criminal 
enforcement proceedings brought under any provision of this chapter 
or State or local law. "144 On the one hand, it is perhaps a fair inference 
that Congress by its silence intended that in other situations the 
common law preclusion rules would apply. On the other hand, a 
counterargument can be formulated from the fact that several pro-
visions preserve federal enforcement authority in the face of ap-
proved state plans145 and the fact that state authority to enact more 
stringent regulations than required by the EPA is also preserved. 146 
F. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act 
In many ways, CERCLA is unique. It is the most recent of the 
statutes, dating only from December 11, 1980; it is the only one to 
142 CAA § 120(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2)(C) (1982). 
143 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 167 n.2 (6th Cir. 1973), after remand, 523 
F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). 
144 CAA § 120(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7420(0 (1982). 
145 See supra note 125. 
146 CAA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982). 
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mention collateral estoppel by name,147 and it is the only one that 
does not have as a goal the delegation of primary enforcement re-
sponsibility to the states. In spite of this last distinction, CERCLA 
does present opportunities for preclusion arguments because of po-
tential overlap with analogous state programs and because it pres-
ents factual situations in which the EPA itself is likely to seek 
multiple recoveries from the same defendant. 
Congress passed CERCLA after experience with the infamous 
Love Canal hazardous waste site and other events showed that 
existing law was inadequate to deal quickly with many actual or 
threatened releases of hazardous substances. 148 Section 7003 of 
RCRA, which dealt with imminent hazards and was RCRA's only 
retroactive provision, had the most promise of existing laws, but 
could not deal with releases of contamination from abandoned facil-
ities, vessels, and other sources not subject to RCRA.149 CERCLA 
was created to fill the gaps in existing laws by providing coverage 
for all releases, intentional or accidental, from all facilities, active or 
inactive, and at all times, past or present. 150 Courts have held the 
standard of liability created thereby to be strict, joint, and several. 151 
CERCLA directs its efforts toward "hazardous substances," which 
are defined by reference to lists from other statutes as well as by 
rulemaking under CERCLA itself.152 The primary thrust of the law 
is to compel responsible parties to report and clean up releases of 
these hazardous substances when they occur without a federal per-
mit. The EPA is given the authority to initiate the cleanup itself or 
to require those potentially responsible to do it.153 When the EPA 
147 CERCLA provides in part: 
[NJo person asserting a claim against the Fund pursuant to this subchapter shall as 
a result of any determination of a question of fact or law made in connection with 
that claim be deemed or held to be collaterally estopped from raising such question 
in connection with any other claim not covered or assertable against the Fund under 
this subchapter arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of circumstances. 
CERCLA § 112(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(e) (1982) (emphasis added). 
148 Frank & Atkeson, Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup: A BNA Special Report, 16 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1 (June 28, 1985). 
l49 R. HALL, T. WATSON, J. DAVIDSON, D. CASE & N. BRYSON, SUPERFUND MANUAL: 
LEGAL AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 1-1 to 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter HALLJ. 
150 [d. at 1-2; see also Frank & Atkeson, supra note 148, at 2. Congress used CWA § 311 
as the model for CERCLA. See generally Superfund: How It Will Work, What It Will Cost, 
CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 17, 1980, at 38-41. 
151 Mays, An Outline of Federal Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Laws, in 1 ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 277,281 (1985). 
152 CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
153 Mays, supra note 151, at 283-84. 
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handles the cleanup itself, it draws upon a fund, nicknamed the 
Superfund, created by the Act and derived primarily from a tax on 
chemical feedstocks. 154 
Enforcement actions under CERCLA are generally of two types: 
those under Section 106 to force parties responsible for the contam-
ination to clean it up, and those under Section 107 to recover costs 
from the responsible parties when others have done the cleanup, 
such as when the EPA has used Superfund money.155 Section 106 is 
couched in the broadest of terms by specifying no class of defendants, 
authorizing the President to seek "necessary" relief, and requiring 
either an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance. Such 
an action is expressly allowed "in addition to any other action taken 
by a State or local government," thus foreclosing the BKK argument 
for an implicit statutory preclusion defense. 
Several sections of CERCLA deal openly with the possibility of 
mUltiple lawsuits. The law prohibits double recoveries by stating 
that a person who has received compensation under CERCLA may 
not also receive compensation under any other state or federal law 
for the same removal costs, damages, or claims, and vice versa. 156 
Double recoveries from the fund itself are also prohibited. l57 Section 
112(e), however, provIdes that determinations of law or fact in con-
nection with a claim against the fund will not have collateral estoppel 
effect in other claims not asserted or assertable against the fund 
"arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of circum-
stances." Decisions by a Board of Arbitrators set up under a former 
provision to hear claims are similarly limited in preclusive effect. 158 
There is also a savings provision that expressly protects other sta-
tutory or common law claims from preclusion arguments when a 
Section 107 cost recovery is being sought, including protection from 
the argument that the plaintiff has split a cause of action. 159 
154 Frank & Atkeson, supra note 148, at 2. 
155 [d.; see also HALL, supra note 149, at 1-3. 
156 CERCLA § 114(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (1982). 
157 CERCLA §§ 107(f)(I), 112(f) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f)(1), 9612(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
Section 9607(f)(1) also prohibits double recovery for damages to natural resources. The leg-
islative history indicates that neither of these provisions was intended to prohibit additional 
claims or actions for different damages arising from the same transaction, a statement that 
limits the application of res judicata. See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 221, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276,3313. 
158 CERCLA § 112(b)(4)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(4)(G) (1982), amended by CERCLA 
§ 112(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). 
159 CERCLA § 112(e) provides in part: 
Regardless of any State statutory or common law to the contrary, no person who 
asserts a claim against the Fund pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed or held 
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This mention of claim splitting is a reference to res judicata. A 
cause of action is "split" when the same cause of action (injury) is 
the basis for two or more separate suits, even though the legal 
theories or grounds for recovery may differ. Res judicata discourages 
claim splitting by the simple principle that the judgment in the first 
suit to reach finality will bar any recovery in subsequent suits on 
the same cause of action. The effect of res judicata and its rule 
against splitting is to force the plaintiff to advance in its first suit 
all theories and grounds for recovery arising from a given cause of 
action. 160 
The scope of such a bar depends, of course, upon how broadly a 
cause of action is defined. In limiting the application of res judicata 
through Section 112(e) of CERCLA, Congress seems to have im-
plicitly presumed that the term "cause of action" would be broadly 
defined to include all injury arising from the same incident, trans-
action, or set of circumstances. 161 It is also noteworthy that Congress 
did not specifically sanction the splitting of causes of action in suc-
cessive CERCLA Section 107 actions. Thus, CERCLA acknowl-
edges the potential application of preclusion defenses to situations it 
creates and does not provide protection from preclusion arguments 
for multiple actions brought under CERCLA Section 107 as it does 
for other statutory or common law claims. 
Consistent with this distinction, CERCLA specifically provides 
that it does not preempt the right of states to impose additional 
liability for releases of hazardous substances. 162 Perhaps because of 
CERCLA's language, many states have enacted similarly far-reach-
ing statutes. As of September 1, 1985, twenty-six states had passed 
their own so-called "mini-superfunds. "163 Because of CERCLA Sec-
tion 112(e), there is little basis for preclusion arguments when there 
to have waived .tny other claim not covered or assertable against the Fund under 
this subchapter arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of circumstances, 
nor to have split a cause of action. 
CERCLA § 112(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(e) (1982). 
160 1B J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 0.410[2] (2d ed. 
1988) [hereinafter MOORE]. 
161 See infra notes 199-216 and accompanying text for more discussion of the significance 
of broad versus narrow definitions of a cause of action. 
162 CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1982). 
163 HALL, supra note 149, at 1-10, 1-12 (specific references to each state's statutes are 
collected at 1-14 to 1-20). A more recent survey of state law concludes that forty-seven states 
have some type of hazardous waste response law, although not all are sufficiently close to 
CERCLA to qualify as mini-superfunds. For an outline of these statutes see Rich, Hazardous 
Waste Clean-up Enforcement under CERCLA and State Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 
NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Mar. 1988, at 3, 15-21. 
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are mUltiple prosecutions of the same defendant for the same trans-
action under CERCLA and a mini-superfund statute. Mini-super-
fund statutes are not based on an express delegation from 
CERCLAI64 and they cannot be said to be in lieu of CERCLA or to 
have the full force and effect of CERCLA because Congress specif-
ically sanctioned the traditional liability of multiple sovereigns. This 
analysis is altered, however, if the state is acting pursuant to an 
express agreement with the EPA. 
The possibility for such agreements arose in 1986 when the Su-
perfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) extensively 
amended CERCLA.165 SARA amended CERCLA Section 104(d)(1) 
to allow the President166 the discretion to enter into cooperative 
agreements or contracts with states to carry out federal responsi-
bilities under CERCLA, including enforcement actions, if the Pres-
ident determines that the state has the capability to carry out such 
actions. 167 The agreement may be site-specific or as broad as the 
President desires. 168 Because an action by a state under such an 
agreement is described as "acting in behalf of the President,"169 res 
judicata and collateral estoppel would surely be as applicable to such 
a state action as they would be if the EPA had brought the action 
for the President. Because different federal officials who bring suc-
cessive actions are in privity with one another under preclusion 
analysis,170 a strong argument can be made that a state official acting 
under contract to the President is also in privity with federal officials, 
regardless of independent authority under state law. 
The primary opportunity for preclusion analysis under CERCLA 
is not in successive federal-state actions, but in successive federal 
actions. Because the federal government can bring suit under Section 
106 to force a polluter to clean up his releases, or can bring suit 
under Section 107 to recover its costs when it performs the cleanup, 
164 Frank & Atkeson, supra note 148, at 17. 
165 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
166 CERCLA assigns most authority at the federal level to the President, who has authority 
under § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1982), to delegate his authority. The President has delegated 
much of this authority to the EPA. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987). 
167 See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 194-95, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CO!"G. & ADMIN. NEWS 3287-88. SARA codified procedures for contracts and cooperative 
agreements with the states that the EPA had already established informally. See Frank & 
Atkeson, supra note 148, at 17. 
168 CERCLA § 104(d)(I)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(I)(A), (B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see 
also H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 194-95, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3287-88. 
169 CERCLA § 104(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(3) (1982). 
170 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4458, at 504. 
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there are two likely scenarios. First, the federal government might 
decide initially to sue under Section 106, and then later decide to 
clean up the site itself and seek reimbursement under Section 107. 
Such a fact pattern occurred in United States v. Outboard Marine 
Corporation, where the Seventh Circuit upheld a dismissal of a 
Section 106 action without prejudice to a future cost recovery suit 
so that the government could maintain a Section 107 action without 
being barred by res judicata. 171 
Second, a complicated government cleanup might entail immediate 
expenditures to remove an imminent threat to health and safety and 
subsequent expenditures to form a complete remedy. If expenses 
are incurred over a period of years, the government might seek to 
sue under Section 107 for successive cost components as they occur 
rather than waiting until the cleanup is completed. 
It is far from certain that either res judicata or collateral estoppel 
could theoretically be applied to either of these scenarios, and, even 
if either could, the frequency of use would depend heavily upon the 
facts of each case. Even in Outboard Marine, the only reported case, 
the issue of preclusion was not clearly raised and the language used 
by the district judge in dismissing the Section 106 action without 
prejudice to a subsequent Section 107 action seemed to be an attempt 
to dispel ambiguity rather than an attempt at a definitive ruling on 
preclusion. 172 For res judicata, the critical issue will be whether 
separate suits are based on separate causes of action. To the extent 
that different injuries can be identified, separate actions can be 
maintained. Collateral estoppel is more problematic, and it may very 
well be that some issue decided in the first suit, such as causation, 
would have collateral estoppel effect in a later suit at the same site. 
SARA clarified somewhat the multiple recovery picture by adding 
to Section 113 a subsection 113(g)(2). This subsection created a stat-
ute of limitations for cost recovery actions and distinguished between 
removal actions and remedial actions under Section 107. An initial 
action to recover the costs of removal work must now generally be 
brought within three years of its completion, while an initial action 
to recover costs for remedial work must generally be brought within 
171 789 F.2d 497, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'g 104 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The district 
judge had expressed skepticism that a trial on the merits of the Section 106 case would have 
resulted in a judgment on issues which would have a collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent 
Section 107 case, apparently because of factual differences in the cases. See Outboard Marine, 
104 F.R.D. at 411 n.l. 
172 Outboard Marine, 104 F.R.D. at 411 n.l. This point was also noted by the Seventh 
Circuit. See Outboard Marine, 789 F.2d at 508. 
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six years of the beginning of "physical on-site construction." Sub-
sequent action to recover additional response costs or damages are 
allowed, but must be commenced within three years of the comple-
tion of all response actions. 
In addition to providing a statutory basis for distinguishing be-
tween removal and remedial actions, the legislative history leaves 
no doubt that the law now specifically contemplates successive ac-
tions. The President may bring a series of claims under Sections 
104, 106, and 107. Earlier claims do not bar other later claims, but 
collateral estoppel remains applicable. 173 
The legislative history's focus on "other claims" indicates that the 
doctrine of res judicata and the rule against claim splitting also 
remain applicable. For each distinctive claim, the EPA must be 
cautious to seek all the relief to which the government is entitled. 
Even in successive claims, collateral estoppel will still be applicable. 
Protection of the government's interests will require careful pleading 
with an eye toward remaining issues. 
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA 
A. Terminology 
The terminology applied to describe the effects of a prior judgment 
is not always consistent. There is a growing trend toward the use 
of the term "res judicata" in a broad sense to apply to both res 
judicata and collateral estoppel as they are more traditionally de-
fined. 174 Advocates of this broad definition of res judicata substitute 
the descriptive phrases "claim preclusion" for the narrow usage of 
173 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3124, 3316 provides: 
The conference substitute also provides . . . for the entry of a declaratory judgment, 
which is to have a binding effect in future claims for future response costs as to the 
vessel or facility in question. This is consistent with the overall structure of CER-
CLA, which contemplates that the President may bring a series of claims for response 
costs under section 107, injunctive relief under section 106, or actions for access 
under section 104 with regard to a particular site or facility. If the President brings 
an earlier action for such claims, he is not barred in a subsequent action from bringing 
other claims. The doctrine of collateral estoppel remains applicable in these actions. 
[d. at 3316 (emphasis added). 
174 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS is perhaps the most influential advocate of 
the broad definition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, at 131 (1982) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS]; see also 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4402, at 6-11. 
1988] EPA OVERFILING 231 
res judicata and "issue preclusion"175 for collateral estoppel and its 
rare counterpart, direct estoppe1. 176 
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of 
this trend,177 it has yet to adopt it and continues to use res judicata 
in the narrow sense. For the sake of clarity in quoting from the 
numerous Supreme Court cases in this area, this paper will use the 
narrow definition throughout. Using this narrow definition, res ju-
dicata and collateral estoppel are mutually exclusive terms and syn-
onymous with claim preclusion and issue preclusion, respectively. 
B. Origins and Policy 
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are traditional common law 
affirmative defenses178 that are closely related to the very purpose 
for which the courts were created, "the conclusive resolution of 
disputes within their jurisdictions."179 According to the Supreme 
Court, they embody the fundamental principle that, once a right, 
question, or fact has been put in issue and decided by a court, the 
same parties or their privies cannot relitigate the same right, ques-
tion, or fact in a subsequent lawsuit. 180 The high esteem the Court 
holds for these doctrines is significant because res jUdicata and col-
lateral estoppel, having been created by judges, do not depend on 
either constitutional or statutory bases for their application. 181 
Despite their common law origins and the sound of their names, 
res judicata and collateral estoppel are not dusty theoretical concepts 
175 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4402, at 6-11. 
176 Because "collateral" refers to the fact that the preclusive effect of a collateral estoppel 
occurs in a second case based on a different cause of action, the phrase "direct estoppel" has 
been used to describe the preclusive effect of an estoppel in a second case based on the same 
cause of action. In most situations, res judicata rather than direct estoppel is the doctrine 
applied when the second cause of action is the same. Nevertheless, there are situations when 
res judicata is inapplicable but an estoppel is still available. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS, supra note 174, § 17 comment c, at 149. Due to the rarity of direct estoppel, this 
Article assumes that res judicata is the doctrine to be applied when the second cause of action 
is the same as the first. 
177 See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.l (1984). 
178 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.408[1], at 288. 
179 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). 
180 The precise quote is as follows: 
A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines 
of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a "right, question or fact distinctly put 
in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be 
disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies . . . ." 
Id. (quoting Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897». 
181 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4403, at 19. 
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that rarely see the light of day in court. On the contrary, they are 
concepts frequently discussed by courts, including the Supreme 
Court. 182 To understand how they might be allowed to restrict en-
forcement activity by the EPA in furtherance of the important so-
cietal goal of improving environmental quality, it is necessary to 
understand that they also have strong policy underpinnings. 
The Supreme Court has noted that these doctrines serve policies 
that are important both to the judiciary and to the public. They 
serve the judiciary by conserving its resources, presenting the op-
portunity to resolve other disputes, and fostering reliance on judicial 
decisions. Such reliance results from minimizing inconsistent deci-
sions. l83 They serve the public by sparing litigants the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuitsl84 and providing the certainty of finding 
an end to litigation and a binding answer.185 Whatever the mix of 
reasons cited in a specific case, conservation of judicial resources 
always seems to figure prominently on the list in recent cases. This 
is due in part, no doubt, to the heavy workload faced by the Supreme 
Court and the warning by the former Chief Justice of the Court's 
need to resort to summary dispositions. 186 
The fact that the policies underlying res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are independent of the "truth" is an indication of their 
strength. That is, they apply whether or not the case in whose name 
they are invoked was rightly or wrongly decided. 187 As the Supreme 
Court has observed, "res judicata renders white that which is black, 
and straight that which is crooked .... No other evidence can afford 
strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument 
can detract from its legal efficacy. "188 Although the Court has also 
cautioned that res judicata should only be invoked after careful 
inquiry,189 the Court has more recently rebuked the Ninth Circuit 
for carving out an exception based on "public policy" and "simple 
justice. "190 To put it succinctly, the Court reminded the Ninth Circuit 
1B2 See infra notes 188-89, 192--93,245,317,396,404 and accompanying text. 
183 Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Brown v. Felsen, 
442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). 
184 Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; Brown, 442 U.S. at 131. 
185 Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946); 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4403, at 15. 
186 Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 445 (1983). 
1B7 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4403, at 17. 
188 Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859). 
1B9 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132 (1979). 
190 Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1981). In its rebuke, the Court 
said: 
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that every litigant is entitled to but a single opportunity to present 
his or her case and the right to appeal the result. 191 The Court has, 
however, recognized the need for redetermination if there is reason 
to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures fol-
lowed in prior litigation. 192 
Acknowledging that collateral estoppel serves the same public 
policies as res judicata, the Supreme Court has identified one situ-
ation where it grants trial courts broad discretion in determining 
when collateral estoppel should be applied: when it is asserted, either 
offensively193 or defensively,194 by one who was not a party to. the 
first suit. 195 None of the environmental statutes previously discussed 
contains an express rejection of either preclusion doctrine in the 
overfiling situation. Thus, the strong Supreme Court policy endors-
ing res judicata and collateral estoppel should prevail in an overfiling 
situation unless the statute in question implicitly mandates a differ-
ent result. To consider this possibility, it is necessary to understand 
the sometimes subtle distinctions between the two doctrines, be-
cause the doctrines may not stand or fall in unison. 
C. Distinctions 
Under claim preclusion, or res judicata, a judgment is the full 
relief between the parties on that claim or cause of action. When the 
"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of 
years is evenhandedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public inter-
ests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a partiCUlar 
case. There is simply "no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by 
a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata." ... "[The] doctrine of res 
judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical 
time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy 
and private peace,' which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts 
" 
Id. at 401 (citations omitted) (italics in original). 
191 See MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.405[4.-1], at 221 (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. 
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982». 
192 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n.ll (1979). 
193 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 331 (1979). 
194 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
334"(1971). 
195 This situation cannot arise in the overfiling scenario because that scenario presumes that 
collateral estoppel, if applicable, will be asserted by a party to the first suit, the defendant. 
For the sake of simplicity, the private party litigant in our hypothetical has been consistently 
referred to as the defendant. For the application of res judicata principles, however, it is only 
necessary that this person be a party to the first suit. The analysis would be the same if in 
the first suit the private party were to be the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, for 
example. See, e.g., Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. California, 674 F.2d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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plaintiff prevails, its claim is "merged" in the judgment and it cannot 
seek further relief in a subsequent action. When the defendant pre-
vails, that judgment is a "bar" to subsequent action against the 
defendant by the plaintiff on that claim. Under claim preclusion, the 
merger and bar effects of the judgment extend to all issues relevant 
to the claim, whether or not they were raised at trial. In contrast, 
issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is based upon the recognition 
that different claims or causes of action between parties may involve 
issues common to them all. Issue preclusion bars the relitigation of 
such a common issue in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of 
action, but only if that issue was actually litigated and necessary to 
the decision in the prior judgment. 196 
Thus, the "cause of action" holds the key to determining which 
doctrine, if either, is applicable to an overfiling scenario. If the suit 
brought by the EPA involves the same cause of action as the state 
suit, then res judicata is the potentially applicable doctrine. If the 
EPA suit involves a different cause of action, then only collateral 
estoppel can be applicable. 
The applicable doctrine will determine the scope of the preclusive 
effect of the state judgment in the overfiling scenario. If res judicata 
applies, then the prior state judgment would totally preclude the 
EPA action through either merger or bar, depending upon which 
party prevailed initially. By contrast, collateral estoppel would give 
preclusive effect in the EPA's suit only to specific issues decided in 
and necessary to the prior state case. This limitation on collateral 
estoppel, however, may not yield a different result than res judicata 
196 This analysis is based on an oft-quoted formulation by Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit: 
"[C]laim preclusion," or true res judicata, ... treats a judgment, once rendered, as 
the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" 
or "cause of action." When the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim 
"merges" in the judgment; he may seek no further relief on that claim in a separate 
action. Conversely, when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiff's claim 
is extinguished; the judgment then acts as a "bar." Under these rules of claim 
preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to 
the same claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial. 
The second doctrine, collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion," recognizes that suits. 
addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits on other 
claims .... [I]ssue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and 
essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation .... 
It is insufficient for the invocation of issue preclusion that some question of fact or 
law in a later suit was relevant to a prior adjudication between the parties; the 
contested issue must have been litigated and necessary to the judgment earlier 
rendered. 
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g and Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,535-36 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(footnotes and citations omitted) (italics in original). 
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in a given case. For example, if the issue decided in the earlier case 
is central to the second case, collateral estoppel can result in dis-
missal of the second case as surely as res judicata. 197 
Although the cause of action is the key factor, a number of other 
factors may determine whether res judicata and collateral estoppel 
are actually applicable. Assuming that the first case will be brought 
by the state alone, as this Article does, res judicata can only be 
asserted against the EPA if it is in privity with the state on the 
facts of the case. Because the state will bring suit under state law, 
and the EPA will bring the second suit under federal law, the causes 
of action may be distinct even though they both have their roots in 
RCRA, and thus res judicata would be inapplicable. Identity of 
parties and causes of action are not required for collateral estoppel, 
so it initially appears to be the more likely candidate for applicability. 
There are other potential limitations, however, to the application 
of collateral estoppel against the United States yet to be explored. 
Privity, causes of action, and other related concepts must be exam-
ined in more detail to reach any conclusions about the applicability 
of the two doctrines to the EPA overfilings. Applicability of res 
judicata will be discussed first because res judicata is a more com-
plete defense, foreclosing issues that might have been litigated but 
were not, and because it has more elements that must be satisfied. 
D. Cause of Action 
Analyzing the causes of action is the first logical step in identifying 
factors affecting applicability of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
to the EPA overfilings. Res judicata forces plaintiffs to assert in 
their first suit all the legal theories and demands for relief to which 
they are entitled for each cause of action. 198 This is the so-called rule 
against claim splitting, previously discussed in regard to CER-
CLA.199 Under older cases, including those of the Supreme Court, 
each legal theory yielded a different cause of action. Thus, the same 
set of facts could result in separate causes of action when the rights 
were created by different sovereigns, different statutes, or by stat-
ute and common law.20o Under such a narrow definition, res judicata 
197 See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982); United States 
v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980). 
198 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.410[1], at 351, 352. 
199 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
200 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.410[1], at 355 n.17. But see older Supreme Court cases 
collected in Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV., 317, 339-40 
(1978). 
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could not be asserted in an overfiling scenario because the EPA and 
the state would have separate causes of action. 
The concept of a cause of action has evolved and broadened 
through the years, however, and presently neither different statutes 
nor different theories of recovery necessarily define different causes 
of action for res judicata purposes, thus opening the door to appli-
cation of res judicata in the overfiling situation. Nowadays, courts 
cannot simply count legal theories, but must analyze whether or not 
the allegedly different claims actually involve different acts, different 
material facts, and different witnesses and documentation. 201 Even 
actions by different sovereigns do not yield different causes of action 
when they are in privity. 202 
Exploring the evolution of the definition of a cause of action is 
necessary to understand the present application of res judicata. The 
definition of "cause of action" or "claim"203 in the context of res 
jUdicata has steadily expanded beyond its original meaning, and now 
focuses on the alleged injury or transaction for which relief is sought, 
rather than the legal theory under which relief is sought.204 Accord-
ing to the Restatement of Judgments, which represents the broadest 
current formulation, a final judgment extinguishes all rights "to 
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the 
action arose. "205 
This transactional definition is a pragmatic one that looks upon a 
cause of action as a set of facts. 206 These facts must be related in 
time, space, origin, or motivation and must form a convenient trial 
unit. 207 In addition, their treatment as a unit must conform to the 
parties' expectations. 208 Such a broad definition of a single cause of 
action, if used by a court, has the effect of greatly expanding the 
potential application of res judicata through its preclusion of matters 
that could have been litigated in the first instance, even though they 
were not. 
201 United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977,984 (3d Cir. 1984). 
202 See infra note 279 and accompanying text. 
203 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS has substituted the word "claim" for "cause 
of action" to avoid confusion with its understanding in other contexts, thus it uses the term 
"claim preclusion" for res judicata. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 24, 
comment 9, at 196. 
204 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.410[1], at 350. 
205 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 24(1). 
206 ld. § 24(2). 
207 ld. 
208 ld. 
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The language of CERCLA indicates that Congress had just such 
a broad definition in mind in establishing the preclusive effects of 
claims against the Superfund. 209 Thus, by sanctioning in CERCLA 
the broadest definition of a cause of action, Congress has encouraged 
the maximum application of res jUdicata. The Supreme Court has 
not gone quite so far, however, at least with respect to adopting the 
broad definition for a cause of action. 
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Kremer v. Chemical Construction 
Corp. noted the increasing acceptance of this broader definition in 
the federal courts, but did not have to face the issue squarely because 
the application of either res judicata or collateral estoppel yielded 
the same result in this case.210 The Court again avoided ruling on 
the transactional definition in 1983 in Nevada v. United States. 211 
The Court noted that definitions of the "same cause of action" have 
not remained static, citing the expansion in the definition from the 
first to the second Restatement of Judgments. 212 The significance of 
these references is, however, that the Court may well be laying the 
foundation for the acceptance of the transactional definition when 
the appropriate case presents itself. 
Acceptance of the transactional definition of claim or cause of 
action is important because it favors the application of res judicata 
rather than collateral estoppel to the overfiling scenario. This con-
clusion follows from the presumption that a single chain of events, 
such as the violation of a permit or failure to meet regulatory re-
quirements under an approved state plan, would be the basis for 
both the state suit and the EPA overfiling. The fact that, from a 
practical standpoint, a state law must be quite similar to the federal 
law it supersedes in order to assure approval bolsters this conclu-
sion.213 In fact, if the state law differs at all from the federal law, it 
is likely to be the more encompassing of the two, because the state 
law must be at least as stringent as the federal law and may be more 
stringent. 214 
209 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
210 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982). 
211 Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 875 (1983). 
212 I d. at 130 n.12. 
213 RCRA is the most explicit in this regard. See RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986); see also CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982); SDWA § 1413a, 42 
U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); CAA §§ 111(c)(1), 112(d)(1), 120(a)(1)(B)(i), 161, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(1), 7412(d)(1), 7420(a)(1)(B)(i), 7471 (1982). 
214 RCRA and the CAA are the most explicit in this regard. See RCRA § 3009,42 U.S.C. 
§ 6929 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); CAA § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982). See also CWA § 510, 33 
U.S.C. § 1370 (1982); SDWA § 1414(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(e) (1982). 
A recent RCRA case suggests that these more stringent state laws represent a limit on 
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The only exception to this conclusion would be in the case of newly-
enacted federal legislation or regulatory amendments that have not 
yet been added by revisions to state plans. For example, RCRA 
Section 3006(g) provided that the requirements or prohibitions ap-
plicable to the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or 
disposal of waste imposed by the 1984 amendments215 would be 
immediately enforceable in all states by the EPA, regardless of 
whether or not they had approved plans. 
While the necessary similarity between state and federal law 
might lead to the prediction that under the transactional definition 
there will be a single cause of action and res judicata will be the 
applicable doctrine, this may not be true. In actual practice, the 
applicable doctrine may vary from case to case depending upon how 
nearly the factual pleadings by the EPA resemble those of the state. 
If the EPA is merely seeking a more stringent penalty for the same 
set of operative facts, res judicata is more likely, but careful pleading 
by the EPA may be able to influence the determination. Having 
determined that actions by a state and the EPA involve the same 
set of facts only leads to the next inquiry-whether both actions 
involve the same parties. 
The major limitation on finding the causes of action of a state and 
the EPA to be identical, and hence the major limitation on the 
application of res judicata in the overfiling scenario, is the fact that 
the EPA is not a party of record to the first judgment. The require-
ment of an identity of parties is one element of a cause of action that 
may not have been influenced as much by the liberal transactional 
analysis. The usual assumption is that every plaintiff has a separate 
cause of action. 216 Nonetheless, it is well established that the re-
EPA's ability to overfile. In United States v. Chemical Resources, Inc., the defendant was 
found to be in violation of the state's financial responsibility requirement, which is not part of 
the federal program. No. 86C-714C, slip op. (N.D. Okla. July 19, 1988), quoted in INSIDE 
E.P.A. WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 26, 1988, at 15. The state dropped its enforcement action 
when the defendant provided proof of insurance, but the EPA then brought its own action to 
revoke the defendant's permit. The court held that "the EPA is not entitled ... to enforce 
financial responsibility requirements established by a State in excess of that proscribed [sic] 
by the federal government." Although some have hailed this as a general limitation on EPA's 
"interference" in programs delegated to the states, it remains to be seen if the· principle can 
be applied beyond the financial responsibility requirements of the underground injection well 
program. Court Decision Reaffirms State RCRA Primacy Authority Setting Precedent, IN-
SIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 26, 1988, at 15. 
215 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 
(1984). 
216 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4407, at 52; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, 
§ 24 comment a, at 198. 
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quirement of identity of parties for finding a single cause of action 
for application of res judicata does not mean literally parties of 
record.217 However broad this definition of "party" is for determining 
a single claim or cause of action, it is also well established that, 
beyond it, there are nonparties who may be bound by the judgment 
under collateral estoppel. 
For example, in Montana v. United States the federal government 
vicariously asserted a first cause of action through a contractor in 
state court and then asserted a second cause of action in its own 
right in federal court. 218 The Montana Court held that these two 
causes of action differed by definition because there was no identity 
of parties, but also held the federal government bound by collateral 
estoppel. 219 The topic of parties and privies is sufficiently complex 
to warrant its own separate treatment. 220 
If res judicata is inapplicable because the cause of action is not 
the same in the second suit, the next inquiry is whether or not 
preclusive effect under collateral estoppel can be given to some issue 
decided in the first suit. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issue 
precluded must be the same as in the prior suit, necessary to that 
decision, actually decided,221 and fully and fairly litigated. 222 Fur-
thermore, the controlling facts must remain unchanged.223 With so 
many qualifications and conditions, it may seem unlikely that either 
res judicata or collateral estoppel would find much application, but 
the overfiling scenario may provide the appropriate factual setting. 
In summary, the identity of the causes of action will determine 
whether res judicata or collateral estoppel is the potentially appli-
cable doctrine. If the cause of action asserted by the EPA in its 
overfiling is determined to be the same as the cause of action pre-
viously asserted by the state in its action, then res judicata is the 
applicable doctrine. The transactional definition of a cause of action, 
with its reliance on common facts rather than legal theories, should 
make it easier to find such an identity. If res judicata is inapplicable, 
however, then the next inquiry should be whether the two causes of 
action involved some common issue or issues. Collateral estoppel is 
217 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.411[1] n.8, at 391. 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4407 n.8, at 
53. 
218 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). 
219Id. at 154-55. 
220 See infra notes 268--362 and accompanying text. 
221 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.443[1], at 759. 
222 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
223 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 600 (1948). 
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applicable to a common issue litigated in, decided by, and necessary 
to the first action. Both doctrines, however, depend upon yet another 
element-a final judgment in the first action. 
E. Final Judgment 
The existence of a final judgment in the first action, the state 
action in the overfiling scenario, is a necessary element for applica-
tion of either res judicata or collateral estoppel. While the concept 
might seem unlikely to provoke serious arguments, it has expanded 
in recent years much like the transactional analysis has expanded 
the traditional view of a cause of action. This section will examine 
the impact of these changes on the overfiling scenario. 
Because res judicata and collateral estoppel both give effect only 
to final judgments , 224 it is axiomatic that there must be a final judg-
ment. 225 The concept of a final judgment has traditionally been 
straightforward, applying only to final decrees in litigated cases, 
whether or not they have been appealed to the next higher court. 226 
Over time, however, the concept has expanded. Of particular rele-
vance to environmental practice is the fact that the concept now 
includes certain administrative determinations and unlitigated judi-
cial consent decrees. As with litigated judicial decrees, both parties 
and their privies may be bound when res judicata or collateral es-
toppel is applicable to these administrative determinations and con-
sent decrees. 227 
Given the administrative nature of environmental practice and the 
financial incentive for both government and industry to settle cases 
by consent, the expansion of the definition of "final judgment" to 
encompass both these situations is potentially significant. Indeed, it 
has been said that most enforcement cases are settled by negotiated 
consent decrees. 228 As a result, this Article will discuss consent 
224 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 13, at 132. It should be noted, however, 
that finality is a more flexible concept for collateral estoppel than for res judicata. See id. 
225 [d. at comment a. 
225 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, §§ 4432, 4433; see also MOORE, supra note 160, 11 0.409[l.-I], 
at 306. 
227 For holdings that administrative determinations are applicable to privies, see Pantex 
Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 1985); Artrip v. Califano, 569 F.2d 
1298, 1300 (4th Cir. 1978). For similar holdings regarding consent decrees, see cases collected 
at Annotation, Res Judicata as Affected by Fact that Former Judgment was Entered by 
Agreement or Consent-Federal Cases, 97 L. Ed. 1188, 1192 n.20 (1952) [hereinafter Agree-
ment or Consent]. 
228 Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: Part II, 14 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10080 (Feb. 1984). 
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decrees first, followed by a discussion of administrative decrees, 
including coverage of administrative consent decrees. 
1. Consent Decrees 
Once a lawsuit is filed, there are a number of possible outcomes 
short of a full litigation ending in a final judgment, and each presents 
its own defenses. This section will place consent decrees into this 
overall picture from a standpoint of preclusion analysis. 
In the absence of a prior final judgment, the defendant in an 
overfiling situation might argue for a stay or abstention in federal 
court in order to gain time to finalize a judgment in existing parallel 
state court litigation. 229 Alternatively, if there is merely an extra-
judicial settlement or compromise, there is no judgment on which to 
base res judicata or collateral estoppel,230 but a court may dismiss 
subsequent litigation by enforcing the settlement as a contract. 231 If 
the parties to the settlement present it to a court and it is embodied 
in a consent decree, however, the settlement becomes a judicial act 
and the analysis changes.232 The potential now exists for application 
of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
A consent agreement resulting in a dismissal of charges that spe-
cifically states that it is with prejudice obviously presents a barrier 
to subsequent litigation.233 The more difficult task for the litigants 
is to determine the preclusive effect of consent agreements that 
result in judgments on the merits. Without a record of trial docu-
menting all the issues actually litigated and inferring those that could 
have been, a consent decree is inherently more ambiguous than a 
decree after full litigation. Res judicata presents fewer conceptual 
difficulties, however, than does collateral estoppel. 
Because a decree based on the consent or stipulation of the parties 
is nonetheless a judicial decree, it does no violence to the expecta-
tions of the parties to accord the same finality under res judicata to 
such a decree as to a fully litigated result. Even in a litigated case 
the concepts of merger and bar extinguish the various theories of 
recovery that were not but could have been advanced in the cause 
229 See infra notes 414-490 and accompanying text. 
230 See, e.g., United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 
1701 (N.D. Iowa 1984). 
231 Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,538 (5th Cir. 1978). 
232Id. 
233 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.409[5], at 325. 
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of action. Only the judgment survives. 234 Thus, judicially-approved 
consent agreements are entitled to res jUdicata effect. 235 
By contrast, collateral estoppel presents serious theoretical diffi-
culties because it operates only against issues actually litigated and 
necessary to the judgment. Because a consent decree does not result 
from litigation of issues,236 the states are split as to whether consent 
decrees should be given collateral estoppel effect.237 State responses 
vary from propositions that consent decrees are never entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect, or that consent decrees are entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect only when the parties to the judgment 
intended that result, or that consent judgments are entitled to col-
lateral estoppel effect to the same extent as other judgments. 238 
Such widely divergent views warrant further explanation. 
Those jurisdictions that do give collateral estoppel effect to con-
sent judgments seem to justify it on either of two theories. According 
to one theory, courts can infer findings from the decree because they 
can presume that courts will still exercise their judgment as to the 
merits. According to the second theory, consent of the parties to 
subsequent preclusion can be inferred from their agreement. 239 De-
spite these two theories, however, the weight of authority favors 
the view that collateral estoppel is inapplicable. 240 Although federal 
courts usually say that consent judgments are to be treated as other 
judgments for the sake of preclusion, 241 they generally have not given 
collateral estoppel effect to consent judgments. 242 
234 See id. at 331. 
235 [d. ~~ 0.409[5], 0.444[1], at 793. 
Nonetheless, application of res judicata to consent judgments is subject to several exceptions 
not applicable to litigated judgments. Annotation, Modern Views of State Courts as to Whether 
Consent Judgment is Entitled to Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Effect, 91 A.L.R. 3d 
1170, 1173-74 (1979 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter Modern Views]; see also Agreement or Consent, 
supra note 227, at 1193-95. 
236 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.444[1], at 793. 
287 [d. ~ 0.444[3]. 
238 See Modern Views, supra note 235, at 1174. 
239 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.444[3], at 811-14. 
240 See James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 180 
(1959). 
241 See, e.g., Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 96-97 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 
242 See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 
1978). It is important to note, however, that because of full faith and credit requirements, it 
is the law of the state, not federal law, which initially determines whether its judgments have 
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent federal litigation. See Marrese v. 
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380-82 (1985). See infra note 364 
and accompanying text. 
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In summary, a prior consent decree with a state may well be 
entitled to preclusive effect as a "final judgment" in a subsequent 
overfiling by the EPA if the other elements are established.243 Pre-
clusive effect is especially likely in a res judicata situation, but the 
result will vary based upon each particular state's law. By compar-
ison, the preclusion rules applicable to administrative determinations 
have been more consistent. 
2. Administrative Determinations 
As administrative bodies have matured and adopted the proce-
dural safeguards of judicial proceedings, courts have become more 
willing to accord preclusive effect to their decisions. 244 Even so, many 
courts continue to state that the application is qualified, and less 
rigid than in the strict judicial context.245 The Restatement insists 
that a decision of a qualifying administrative tribunal "has the same 
effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions 
and qualifications, as a judgment of a court."246 
Taking a position similar to the Restatement's, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that certain administrative decisions can have pre-
clusive effect in subsequent judicial proceedings. In Kremer v. Chem-
ical Construction Corp., the Court clearly indicated that the admin-
istrative nature of the tribunal did not ipso facto rule out subsequent 
preclusion. Rather, the question was whether the administrative 
agency was acting in a judicial capacity, as evidenced by whether 
the opposing parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate disputed 
issues of fact.247 It is also clear that such preclusion can be asserted 
, 
243 See Kaspar, 575 F.2d at 538. 
244 See, e.g., Long v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 751 F.2d 339, 343-44 (10th Cn-. 
1984); Korach v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 747 F.2d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 1984); Anthan v. 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706, 708-11 (8th Cir. 1982); see also 18 
WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4475, at 764. 
245 See, e.g. ,-Martin v. Donovan, 731 F.2d 1415, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984); Artukov'ic v. Ilhmigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 693 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. Alexander, 
484 F. Supp. 455, 464 (N.D.N. Y. 1980), a/I'd, 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980); see also cases 
collected at 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST 3d 513-16 (West & Supp. 1984). 
246 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 83(1), at 266. 
247 In Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., the Supreme Court said: 
Certainly, the administrative nature of the factfinding process is not dispositive. In 
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., we held that, so long as opposing 
parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate disputed issues of fact, res jUdicata 
is properly applied to decisions of an administrative agency acting in a "judicial 
capacity." 
456 U.S. 461, 484 n.26 (1982) (citations omitted). 
Kremer involved an employment discrimination claim that a New York admil'list~tive 
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against the United States,248 and that administrative determinations 
can be "judicial" for the application of full faith and credit princi-
ples.249 
The most frequently cited Supreme Court case on the issue of 
whether an administrative determination is entitled to preclusive 
effect is United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co .. The 
Utah Construction Court held that agency decisions are entitled to 
preclusive effect when the agency acts in an adjudicatory, judicial, 
or quasi-judicial capacity.25O This case and others establish the rule 
that an administrative decision is entitled to preclusive effect if the 
forum is an adequate procedural substitute for a court and the sta-
tutory scheme that created the forum did not intend to prohibit 
preclusion. 251 Thus, a spectrum of administrative proceedings can be 
envisioned running from an administrative tribunal almost indistin-
guishable from a court, one whose determinations are clearly pre-
clusive, to nonadversary executive decisionmaking, which clearly 
does not meet the Utah Construction test. 252 
Just where the dividing line lies between the extremes on this 
spectrum is not precise. Administrative proceedings based solely on 
written records without live witnesses and cross-examination prob-
ably do not pass the test. 253 The Restatement of Judgments has 
identified five "essential elements of adjudication" for preclusion that 
can be summarized as follows: 1) adequate notice to those to be 
bound; 2) presentation of evidence and argument and the opportunity 
to rebut that of the opposition; 3) formulation of issues of law and 
fact regarding a specific transaction; 4) a final decision; and 5) other 
agency found to be meritless. Id. at 461. Utah Construction held that the decisions of the 
Armed Forces Board of Contract Appeals were conclusive for claims over which it had 
jurisdiction. See 384 U.S. 394, 423 (1966). 
248 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 146 (1976); Artrip v. Califano, 568 F.2d 
1298, 1300 (4th Cir. 1978). 
In both cases, the plaintiffs lost because they failed to show that the United States was in 
privity with a party to the first case, not because the doctrine was inapplicable against the 
United States. Cappaert involved a prior state administrative adjudication of water rights to 
an underground aquifer in Nevada that conflicted with federal claims of reserved water rights. 
As a result of the outcome in that case, the McCarren Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, was 
passed to allow the mandatory joinder of the United States in state adjudications of entire 
watercourses. See W. GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 30~1 (1984). 
249 See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478; United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agric. Employment Bd., 
669 F.2d 1249, 1255 (1982). 
250 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); see also cases collected 
at 73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 155, at 139-40 n.39 (1983). 
251 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4475, at 765. 
252Id. 
253 I d. at 766. 
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procedural rules necessary because of complexity, urgency, or op-
portunity to obtain evidence. 254 
If an administrative forum meets these elements, and the parties 
prefer to enter into a consent decree rather than litigate, the consent 
decree may also be entitled to preclusive effect. In United States v. 
SCM Corp., the EPA overfiled after Maryland and SCM entered 
into an administrative consent order designed to bring the defendant 
into compliance with the CAA.255 The court did not have to determine 
the preclusive effect of a decree because the defendant was seeking 
a stay or dismissal under an abstention argument. The court noted, 
however, that collateral estoppel would have been a more appropri-
ate theory, implying that the administrative consent decree was not 
inherently unworthy of preclusive effect. 256 
Two additional CAA cases also address the effect of previous state 
administrative proceedings. In United States v. Harford Sands, Inc., 
a case involving an EPA overfiling, the judge correctly refused to 
give any preclusive effect to an informal agreement with the state. 257 
In a second case, United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., the 
judge summarily dismissed a preclusion argument based upon a prior 
administrative consent order with the state because "there was no 
previous state court action. "258 While such reasoning is clearly in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Utah Construction, 
it appears that the administrative decision may not have been issued 
after an adjudicatory process, and thus Lehigh may be factually 
consistent with Utah Construction. 
Several CWA cases also discuss the effect of previous state ad-
ministrative proceedings. In United States v. Pennsylvania Envi-
ronmental Hearing Bd., a case reminiscent of SCM, the Third Cir-
cuit considered the validity of an order by the Board that levied civil 
penalties on a contractor operating a government ammunition 
plant.259 The court cited Utah Construction and other authorities, 
254 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 83(2), at 266-67. Note that the RE-
STATEMENT's use of the tenn res judicata refers to both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 
See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
255 United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 413-14 (D. Md. 1985). 
256 [d. at 418 n.16. The Eleventh Circuit has also approached the issue obliquely in a non-
environmental case, stating that an infonnal settlement agreement in an administrative case 
was not entitled to res judicata effect, but implying that a fonnal consent judgment was so 
entitled. City of Pompano Beach v. Federal Aviation Admin., 774 F.2d 1529, 1538-39 n.1O 
(nth Cir. 1985). 
267 575 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Md. 1983) (prosecution for violation of federal law "unaffected" 
by infonnal agreement to Remedial Compliance Schedule). 
258 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1701 (N.D. Iowa 1984). 
269 584 F.2d 1273, 1276 n.15 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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but bypassed the issue of the preclusive effect of the Board order 
after noting that neither party had raised the issue of the order's 
res judicata effect on the federal case. 260 The preclusion issue was 
raised again in United States v. Scott Paper Co., but, in that case, 
the court also failed to give preclusive effect to prior state admin-
istrative action. 261 The order of the state Pollution Control Hearing 
Board apparently lacked finality because the order was specifically 
conditioned by the language "unless a court for good cause orders 
otherwise. "262 
Thus, there is no reported environmental case that has applied 
preclusion against the EPA based on a prior state administrative 
decree, but there are courts suggesting that the issue is a proper 
one to raise. Once again the variability of state law makes it impos-
sible to generalize as to which environmental statute's administrative 
decisions might qualify for preclusion. Under full faith and credit 
principles, however, administrative judgments that are judicial in 
nature are entitled to enforcement just as judicial decrees would be, 
as long as state rules on preclusion comport with constitutional due 
process. 263 
In comparison with the overfiling cases, cases dealing with citizen 
suits provide some insight on what kinds of state administrative 
action will qualify for preclusion. Each environmental statute under 
consideration in this Article has a provision that allows a citizen to 
sue as a private attorney general if the state or the EPA is not 
diligently prosecuting the alleged polluter in state or federal court. 264 
As a result, the question of whether state administrative enforce-
ment is equivalent to state court action has arisen in a number of 
26°Id. 
261 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2017,2020 (W.D. Wash. 1977). 
262Id. 
263 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982). 
264 See CWA § 505(b)(I)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) (1982); RCRA § 7002(b)(I)(B), 42 
U.S.C. § 6971(b)(I)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); CAA § 304(b)(I)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(I)(B) 
(1982); SDWA § 1449(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(I)(B) (1982). The statutory language is 
identical for the CWA and RCRA. Each permits a citizen suit unless the EPA "Administrator 
or state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of 
the United States or State." See CWA § 505(b)(I)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) (1982); RCRA 
§ 7002(b)(I)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(I)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The CAA is almost the 
same, but omits reference to criminal action. See CAA § 304(b)(I)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(I)(B) 
(1982). The SDWA adds reference to the United States Attorney General, and omits reference 
to state courts, but not the state. See SDWA § 1449(b)(I)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(I)(B) 
(1982). It is said that this omission in the SDWA eliminates the temptation that a federal 
prosecutor might have to avoid citizen intervention by filing suit in a state court that accorded 
the right to the federal government, but not to citizens. Miller, supra note 228, at 10068-69. 
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cases, much like the question of whether a state administrative 
action is "judicial" under Utah Construction. 
Unfortunately for this comparison with the EPA overfilings, citi-
zen suit cases have not focused on whether the administrative actions 
were judicial in nature. Rather, they have focused on whether the 
administrative agency in question had the same enforcement au-
thority as the given statute provided to judicial courts in its civil 
penalties provisions. For example, under the CAA courts have asked 
whether the agency could enjoin violations, assess penalties of up to 
$25,000 per day, and permit citizen intervention by right. 265 Using 
such a focus, one court found the Pennsylvania Environmental Hear-
ing Board to fall short,266 while another found the N ew York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to pass mus-
ter.267 Although these citizen suit cases do not precisely follow the 
preclusion analysis, they do present fertile ground for the argument 
that preclusion is potentially applicable. 
The requirement that the prior state administrative enforcement 
authority be equivalent to any applicable state judicial action seems 
more technical than that required for preclusion in general under 
Utah Construction. Nevertheless, a defendant who has already been 
before an agency like the New York DEC certainly has a potent 
argument that the DEC's decisions have res judicata and collateral 
estoppel effect because the DEC has been found to be equivalent to 
a state court. Perhaps when preclusive effect is given to such an 
agency's determinations outside the citizen suit context, the way will 
be opened for the Utah Construction test, the Supreme Court's 
general test for determination of the preclusive effect of a prior 




As a general rule, parties may be bound by the preclusive effects 
of prior judgments, while nonparties may not. Although this rule is 
265 Miller, supra note 228, at 10069-70. 
266 See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 217-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 961 (1979). 
267 See Love v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832, 839 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
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far from being swallowed by its exceptions, many nonparties may 
be bound nonetheless.268 A privy is one such exception. In the jargon 
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a privy is anyone who may 
be bound by a judgment even though not literally a party to it. 
Privity is a conclusion about the relationship between a party and 
a nonparty, rather than an analytical tool. The Restatement of Judg-
ments avoids using "privity," as well as "cause of action," because 
they are both ambiguous.269 Similarly, "party" and "privity" are 
flexible concepts.270 The flexibility in all these concepts may give 
judges de facto discretion in the application of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel that would otherwise seem unavailable after the 
strong policy pronouncements of the Supreme Court discussed pre-
viously.271 
This Article adopts the traditional use of "privy" to describe a 
nonparty who may be bound by a judgment,272 while recognizing 
that case law holds that some additional nonparties have been pre-
cluded by a prior judgment without a finding of privity.273 For ex-
ample, both the Restatement of Judgments and the Supreme Court 
speak of nonparties who may be bound to a judgment by their 
conduct without being "in privity. "274 In order to cover the topic 
completely, then, this section will begin by discussing the traditional 
notion of privity as it has developed to the present, and will also 
discuss other nonparties who have been precluded by prior litigation 
without being labeled as privies. 
Use of the traditional definition of privity requires one other ca-
veat to reflect varying usages by the courts: some privies may be 
treated as parties while others may not. The effect of this distinction 
is to intertwine the concepts of privity and cause of action and thus 
affect the applicability. of res judicata versus collateral estoppel. For 
example, if the relationship is such that a privy is bound as a "party," 
then there is an identity of parties, allowing the possibility of an 
identity of causes of action and a res judicata situation. If, however, 
the relationship is such that the nonparty may be bound but is not 
a "party," only collateral estoppel may be asserted against that 
nonparty. Such fine distinctions may serve no real purpose, because, 
288 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 62 comment a. 
289 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, Ch. 1, Introduction, at 13-14. 
270 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.411[1]. 
271 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4448. 
272 See supra notes 182-94 and accompanying text. 
273 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 & n.5 (1979). 
274 [d. 
1988] EPA OVERFILING 249 
as mentioned elsewhere, application of either doctrine seems fre-
quently to produce the same result in actual cases. 275 Analysis, rather 
than labels, is the key to understanding this aspect of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel. 
As traditionally defined, then, privity is a key issue in the appli-
cation of either res judicata or collateral estoppel because neither 
may be asserted against one who was not a party or privy to the 
first action.276 This conclusion follows logically from the definition of 
res judicata, which requires an identity of parties in the first and 
second suits. In the case of collateral estoppel, which has not re-
quired an identity of parties since the abolition of the mutuality 
rule,277 it follows from the fundamental requirement of due process 
that the party against whom preclusion is sought must have had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit. 278 
In the application of privity issues to the overfiling scenario, one 
must start with the fact that the EPA will not be a named party to 
a state suit that precedes an EPA suit, and the general rule that 
separate governments are separate parties.279 Then one must con-
sider what EPA actions, in light of the federal-state partnership 
arrangement of the CWA, SDWA, CAA, and RCRA and the over-
filing policy of the EPA, might lead to privity. Such actions might 
include pretrial action, such as pressure on the state to bring suit, 
to bring suit within a certain time, or to seek certain minimum 
penalties; and actions during trial, such as assisting the state by 
providing strategy and evidence. 
275 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982). See also supra 
note 208 and accompanying text. 
276 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.411[1]. 
277 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1979). 
Use of collateral estoppel by one who is not bound by the judgment in the first suit is said 
to be nonmutual. For many years, the mutuality rule prevented the use of collateral estoppel 
by one who was not a party or privy to the first judgment. The Supreme Court generally 
eliminated the mutuality rule in federal cases and approved the use of nonmutual collateral 
estoppel in Park lane. 
Mutuality is not an issue in our scenario because collateral estoppel will be asserted by a 
party to both suits, the private party litigant in Park lane did not alter the requirement that 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must always be a party or privy to the 
first suit. Collateral estoppel will be asserted defensively in our scenario, that is, by the 
defendant against the plaintiff. The distinctions between offensive and defensive nonmutual 
collateral estoppel are irrelevant, however, because mutuality is present in our scenario. See 
id. at 326 & n.4. 
278 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 
(1971). 
279 See 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4458. This is the so-called "two-sovereign" or "dual 
sovereignty" rule. 
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There are three categories of cases extending preclusion that are 
relevant to the potential for privity in the overfiling scenario.280 The 
first category involves a traditional privity analysis in which preclu-
sion is extended to persons who were represented by parties with 
the authority to do so. The second category involves situations in 
which preclusion is extended to nonparties whose participation is so 
extensive that they are de facto parties. The final category covers 
cases in which the party to the first suit shared such an identity of 
interests with the subsequently precluded party so as to be its 
"virtual representative."281 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.282 
represents the first group, Montana v. United States283 represents 
the second group, and Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew84 represents 
the last. 
B. Cases 
1. United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. 
One of the leading environmental cases to address the privity issue 
is United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. 285 In that case, the Ninth 
Circuit found the EPA to be in privity with the State of Washington 
Department of Ecology (DOE) in an enforcement action under the 
CWA involving mutual defensive collateral estoppel. 286 In November 
1973, the EPA approved the state's permit program and transferred 
permit-issuing authority to the DOE. In August 1974, the DOE 
issued a permit to Rayonier. Because the EPA had not yet issued 
effluent limitations for pulp mills, the permit incorporated discharge 
limitations from prior legislation and provided in a footnote that they 
would be modified to conform to final effluent guidelines when pro-
mulgated by the EPA. 287 
Thereafter, a dispute arose over Rayonier's implementation plan. 
After being advised by the EPA that Rayonier would be a candidate 
for federal enforcement if the state did not act, DOE issued a com-
pliance order in December 1975 that Rayonier appealed to the state 
Pollution Hearings Board. In February 1976, prior to the hearing 
by the Board, the EPA promulgated standards that Rayonier and 
280 Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 1026-29 (1986). 
281 [d. 
282 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
283 440 U.S. 147 (1979). 
284 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975). 
285 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980). 
286 See id. at 1003. 
287 [d. at 999. 
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other pulp mills challenged in federal court.288 At the hearing in July 
1976, Rayonier argued that the footnote in its permit extended its 
compliance schedule until final judicial approval of the new effluent 
limits. Rayonier lost at the Board level, but appealed and won a 
reversal in state court. 289 DOE subsequently appealed to the state 
supreme court. 290 
In April 1977, several weeks after the first state court decision, 
the EPA filed suit against Rayonier itself in federal district court. 
In October 1977, the district court construed the same footnote 
against Rayonier and granted the EPA's summary judgment mo-
tion. 291 During the appeal of that judgment, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld, with one exception, the effluent limits for the 
pulp industry.292 Also, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the 
prior ruling of the state court, thereby rendering it a final judg-
ment.293 Thus, by the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the 
permit had expired. Rayonier had installed new conforming control 
equipment, and the only remaining issue concerned civil penalties 
for past alleged misconduct. 294 
The Rayonier court first examined the CWA to see if there were 
any policy reasons that would abrogate res judicata principles. 295 The 
court noted that the EPA's authority was preserved despite the 
state permit-issuing power, but ruled that this concurrent enforce-
ment authority did not per se negate res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. It found significant the fact that CWA permits are issued 
under a single system authorized by a single act of Congress, even 
though the state program functions in lieu of federal authority. 296 
Finally, in ruling that the Act itself was not hostile to res judicata, 
the court observed that the EPA had the authority to veto state-
issued permits, revoke a state's permit-issuing authority, and bring 
an action if it was dissatisfied with a state's enforcement.297 
Next, the Rayonier court considered whether collateral estoppel 
was factually applicable, and found that privity was the only element 
in contention because both suits arose out of the same set of opera-
2B8 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
289 ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 91 Wash. 2d 68~ 586 P.2d 1155 (1978), 
modified, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979). 
290 [d. at 684-86, 586 P.2d at 1157. 
291 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1980). 
292 [d. 
293 [d. at 999-1000. 
294 [d. at 1000. 
295 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c) (1982), amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b), (c) (West Supp. 1988). 
296 Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1000-02. 
297 [d. 
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tive facts to enforce the same permit. 298 Before examining the rela-
tionship between the EPA and the DOE, the court laid the ground 
rules by stating that it was "no longer bound by rigid definitions of 
parties or their privies," and that "'privy' may include those whose 
interests are represented by one with authority to do SO."299 
In examining the privity issue, the court observed that the DOE 
had filed suit only after prompting by the EPA and, furthermore, 
that the DOE had vigorously litigated in the state proceedings. In 
addition, the court found that the interests of the DOE and the EPA 
were identical because they had maintained the same positions be-
fore the state board and courts and both had acted to enforce the 
same permit. The court ruled that, whatever the proper label for 
their relationship, it was "sufficiently 'close' under the circumstances 
to preclude relitigation of the issue already resolved in state court" 
as to the interpretation of the permit footnote. 300 
In deciding the Rayonier case on collateral estoppel, rather than 
res judicata grounds, the court went no further than necessary to 
reach a judgment on the facts of that case. The interpretation of the 
permit footnote was a sine qua non of the EPA's case. Once the 
court determined that the footnote issue was assertable against the 
EPA in the present litigation under collateral estoppel, the EPA's 
case vanished as completely as it would have under res jUdicata. The 
facts cited by the court, however, suggest that there was but a single 
cause of action and thus that res judicata would have been applicable 
to preclude relitigation of any issue that might have been raised in 
the state case.301 The single permit, the single program based on a 
single act of Congress, and the single set of operative facts cited by 
the court are evidence that there was but one cause of action, at 
least under a transactional analysis. 
This evidence becomes more significant in light of the fact that, 
on one issue, the Rayonier court did go further than was necessary 
to decide the case on collateral estoppel grounds: the court held that 
the "existence of concurrent enforcement powers does not per se 
negate the application of res judicata principles. "302 Thus, through 
dicta, the court opened the door for application of res judicata as 
well as collateral estoppel in statutes with federal and state power-
298 [d. at 1002. 
299 [d. at 1003. 
300 [d. 
301 [d. at 1002. 
302 [d. at 1001. 
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sharing arrangements. The element missing for a determination that 
res judicata was applicable in Rayonier was a finding that the EPA 
was a "party" to the state suit. 
Subsequent to Rayonier, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel against the EPA in a case under 
the CAA.303 It reaffirmed its Rayonier decision in Aminoil U.S.A., 
Inc. v. California State Water Resources Control Bd.,304 however, a 
case involving the proper application of the definition of "wetlands" 
under the CWA. In that case, Aminoil sought, as the logical corollary 
to collateral estoppel, the mandatory joinder of the EPA in its state 
court action to avoid the necessity of subsequent litigation with the 
EPA in federal court. Acknowledging the logical symmetry of such 
an argument, the court nevertheless ruled that the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity precluded the exercise of jurisdiction by a state 
over the EPA.305 Thus, res judicata and collateral estoppel remain 
affirmative defenses that must be pled in every case in which they 
are arguably applicable. 
Under the combined analyses of Rayonier and Aminoil, the EPA 
retains the discretion to decide for itself whether to join in a suit in 
state court or to abstain and run the risk (If being precluded by their 
abstention from joinder in subsequent litigation. Although many 
commentators have urged that mandatory joinder and concepts of 
privity for collateral estoppel be combined in a single rule, Aminoil 
is consistent with the opposing position that the two should remain 
merely analogous. 306 
The critical facts of Rayonier are those necessary to the finding 
of privity between the EPA and the state, because they determine 
the breadth of application to the overfiling scenario. Although the 
court stated that the suit "may be sui generis,"307 a statement it 
reiterated in Aminoil,308 the court was probably referring to the 
construction of the permit issued before final EPA regulations rather 
than the factual circumstances that led to privity. The court cited 
for its conclusion only the fact that the permit in Rayonier had 
303 See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980). This case arose 
before the Supreme Court ruled that non-mutual collateral estoppel could not be asserted 
against the United States. See infra note 406 and accompanying text. 
304 See 674 F.2d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 1982). 
305 [d. at 1237. 
306 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4407, at 51. 
307 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1980). 
308 Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227, 
1236 (9th Cir. 1982). 
254 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:199 
expired and that the relevant regulations had been finalized, leaving 
the EPA's attempt at a duplicative penalty the only issue.309 Even 
if the court was referring to privity, the most that can be said about 
the "sui generis" references is that the court failed to anticipate the 
EPA policy on overfiling and the frequency with which such facts 
might arise in the future. 
Although Rayonier stands alone as an example of the successful 
use of res judicata or collateral estoppel in an overfiling situation, 
other courts have presumed in dicta that the preclusion doctrines 
are potentially applicable. In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, also a 
CWA case, the Eighth Circuit declined to apply res judicata only 
because the state case relied upon by the private party litigant had 
been remanded by the state supreme court and hence was not final. 310 
In the only other reported circuit court case, the Sixth Circuit spoke 
with approval of the application of res judicata in the context of 
overfiling under the CAA.311 
The failure of Rayonier to generate more of its kind is something 
of a mystery, assuming that such cases exist. At least in some 
instances, this lack of companion cases can be charged to a failure 
of defendants to raise the issues of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. Such an omission is fatal to affirmative defenses and is a flaw 
not lost on judges, who have pointedly noted this fact in their opin-
ions. 312 In another line of cases, the EPA has succeeded in preempt-
ing res judicata and collateral estoppel by bringing suit before the 
parallel state case reached final judgment. 313 Finally, Rayonier oc-
309 Rayonier, 627 F.2d at 1004. 
310 See 514 F.2d 492, 535 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). 
311 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 167 n.2 (6th Cir. 1973), after remand, 523 
F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). See supra note 141 and accompanying 
text. 
312 In United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411 (D. Md. 1985), the judge felt compelled 
to point out, both in the text and in a footnote, that the defendant had not raised the issues 
of res judicata or collateral estoppel in a case under the CAA where the EPA was seeking 
injunctive relief and civil penalties for precisely the same transaction for which the defendant 
had previously entered into an administrative consent order with the state. See id. at 415, 
418 n.16. Instead, the defendant sought a stay or dismissal under the Colorado River doctrine, 
which was said by the court to require actual litigation in concurrent jurisdictions. See id.; 
see also United States v. Pennsylvania Envtl. Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1276, n.15 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
313 For example, see the following three CWA cases: United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. 
Supp. 734, 750 (D. Del. 1981); United States v. Scott Paper Co., 10 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
2017 (W.D. Wash. 1977); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 535 (8th Cir. 1975), 
modified, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); and the following two CAA cases: United States v. 
Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697 (N.D. Iowa 1984); United States 
v. Hartford Sands, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md. 1983). In Cargill, the court stayed the 
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curred before recent Supreme Court cases demonstrated that the 
philosophy behind the use of res judicata and collateral estoppel to 
conserve judicial resources could outweigh competing philosophies 
favoring federal agency relitigation. 314 As a result, a recent Supreme 
Court case approving the use of mutual defensive collateral estoppel 
against the EPA by defendants sued in different federal circuits may 
bring preclusion defenses to the attention of other defendants. 315 
There surely will be other such defendants, unless the EPA is com-
pletely satisfied with all the state enforcement actions in all the 
programs in all the states. 
If the EPA intends to overfile under the CAA, CWA, RCRA, or 
the SDWA because the relief sought by the state is too lenient,316 it 
is difficult to see how such a case would factually differ from Ray-
onier. Like the CWA, the other three statutes set up a federal/state 
partnership, reserving the EPA enforcement authority.317 The per-
mits under the CWA and the permits under the other statutes are 
derived from a single act of Congress, even if they are issued by a 
state.318 Thus, it is unlikely that Rayonier and its finding of some 
level of privity between the EPA and a state in an overfiling situation 
is an isolated aberration or an event that will not be repeated. 
Rayonier remains the most significant case applying preclusion to 
the overfiling scenario. 
2. Montana v. United States 
Montana v. United States319 stands next to Rayonier in its impor-
tance to the application of preclusion to the overfiling scenario. In 
Montana, the Supreme Court held that the United States was col-
laterally estopped from challenging the constitutionality of a Mon-
tana gross receipts tax. 320 This tax was applied to contractors of 
public construction projects and had previously been litigated and 
upheld in state court in a suit brought by a federal contractor. 
federal suit, nonetheless, because the disagreement between the state and EPA was primarily 
over the dollar amount of the penalty. 508 F. Supp. at 745. In Lehigh, there was a consent 
decree issued by a state agency, but no state court action. 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1698. 
314 But see Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980) and cases 
cited therein. 
315 United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984). 
316 This situation is one listed in the EPA Policy Statement. See EPA POLICY STATEMENT, 
supra note 22, at 22-23. 
317 See supra notes 43, 68, 81, 96, 125 and accompanying text. 
318 See supra notes 32, 61, 76, 94, 120 and accompanying text. 
319 440 U.S. 147 (1979). 
320 [d. at 161-62. 
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Although the United States was not a named party in the state suit, 
the Court applied the rule that collateral estoppel is applicable "when 
nonparties assume control over litigation in which they have a direct 
financial or proprietary interest and then seek to redetermine issues 
previously resolved. "321 As evidence of federal control, the Court 
cited the fact that the United States required its contractor to file 
the suit in state court, reviewed and approved the complaint, paid 
attorney's fees and costs, directed appeal to the state supreme court, 
appeared and submitted a brief as an amicus before the state su-
preme court, directed the filing of a notice of appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, and later directed the abandonment of that 
appeal. 322 
On its face, Montana seems to be a case of pervasive and absolute 
control by a nonparty. The precedent case quoted by the Court 
suggests, however, that a personal stake in the outcome, and assis-
tance in litigation in furtherance of that interest, can be enough , 323 
although participation must certainly amount to more than filing an 
amicus brief. 324 Acting vicariously through the state, the EPA must 
be able to affect the introduction of evidence, examination of wit-
nesses, and appeal. 325 The question, then, is whether the overfiling 
scenario presents opportunities for the EPA to exercise sufficient 
control over a state to be bound by the outcome of its enforcement 
action. 
The control given to the EPA in RCRA is typical of the other 
statutes and clearly gives the EPA extensive control over the states 
with approved programs.326 The EPA is the approval authority for 
state plans. 327 It can require modification of approved plans328 and 
can withdraw approval for cause.329 Moreover, the EPA can suspend 
or revoke any permit issued by a state330 and can sue to enforce such 
permits on its own behalf. 331 Finally, the EPA allocates financial 
grants for development and implementation of authorized state haz-
ardous waste programs. 332 In short, the EPA has many coercive 
321 [d. at 154. 
822 [d. at 155. 
323 [d. at 154 (quoting Souffront v. Compagniedes Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1910». 
324 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.411[6], at 442-43. 
325 Note, Develop'IMnts in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 856 (1952). 
326 See supra notes 311-12. 
327 RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
328 40 C.F.R. § 271.21 (1987). 
329 RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1982). 
330 RCRA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
331 RCRA § 3008(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
332 RCRA § 3011(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6931 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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tools at its disposal to encourage state compliance with the EPA's 
"timely and appropriate" enforcement guidelines. 
Although the existence of the foregoing measures does not nec-
essarily mean that the EPA controls every state enforcement action, 
the presence of a few additional facts could result in a strong argu-
ment for state control. For example, if a state took enforcement 
action only after notice from the EPA that the EPA was about to 
file itself, such notice might make a prima facie case for control. 
While there is no environmental case that explores this "control" 
issue in the overfiling situation, the Ninth Circuit did consider con-
trol in another setting. In Shell Oil Co. v. Train,333 the court rejected 
the theory that denial of a permit or variance by a state water board 
because of alleged EPA domination or coercion was a federal agency 
action reviewable in federal court. 334 The Ninth Circuit seemed es-
pecially disturbed by the novelty of the theory.335 As a result, the 
case may not be a precedent for the overfiling situation. N everthe-
less, while a cause of action based upon control of a state by EPA 
might be novel, a determination that two parties are in privity for 
res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes because one party con-
trols the other is not. 
3. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew 
In addition to the two categories of cases represented by Rayonier 
and Montana, there exists a third category that is relevant to the 
potential for privity in the overfiling scenario. This third category 
of cases, represented by the "virtual representation" standard of 
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew,336 has been described as the most 
radical departure from traditional preclusion rules. 337 Under this 
standard, "a nonparty is bound if a party who had the same interests 
litigated the prior case, even though the nonparty was neither a 
participant nor in privity with a party in the prior proceeding."338 
The Aerojet case is not only instructive for preclusion purposes, 
but also shows the hazards of buying land in south Florida. Aerojet 
obtained an option to purchase land it was leasing from two Florida 
state agencies. 339 Afterwards, the state enacted a law prohibiting 
338 Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978). 
334 [d. at 413. 
335 [d. 
336 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 366 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Fla. 1973), a/I'd, 511 F.2d 710 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975). 
337 Motomura, supra note 280, at 1029. 
338 [d. 
339 Aerojet, 511 F.2d at 713. 
258 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:199 
the sale of land to private buyers unless the land was first offered 
to the county in which it was located. When Aerojet sought to 
exercise its option, the agencies refused and Aerojet then obtained 
a federal judgment for specific performance. 340 
In this first suit, neither of the two defendant state agencies 
argued that the new state law affected the option.341 Dade County, 
the location of the land, then sought and received a writ of mandamus 
from a state court to compel the state agencies to convey the land 
to it in accordance with the statute. 342 The county then sued to quiet 
title in state court while Aerojet countersued in federal district court 
to enjoin the mandamus action, arguing that Dade was precluded by 
the res judicata effect of Aerojet's first federal suit.343 The county's 
suit was then removed to federal district court and consolidated with 
Aerojet's suit. 344 The district court agreed with Aerojet,345 and the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the district court by applying the concept of 
virtual representation to the relationship between the county and 
the state, a participant in Aerojet's first suit. 346 
The concept of virtual representation was not new, having long 
been used in probate proceedings to bind those unknown or not yet 
born,347 but the express application in a less arcane setting certainly 
was. The court in Aerojet found the necessary identity of interests 
in the fact that the state's interest was in avoiding a sale to Aerojet, 
and that a sale to the county would have achieved that result. 348 
Although the state's desire was to keep the land itself, this interest 
was not contrary to the county's interest because the county had no 
right under the statute unless Aerojet's option was valid. 349 Because 
the state could have raised the law to protect its interest in the first 
suit, and because both the state's suit and the county's suit concerned 
the same subject matter and therefore constituted a single cause of 
action,350 res judicata precluded relitigation. 
340 See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Kirk, 318 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd sub nom. 
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), eert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 
(1972). 
341 Aerojet, 511 F.2d at 713-14. 
342 [d. at 714. 
343 [d. 
344 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 366 F. Supp. 901, 905 (N.D. Fla. 1973), a/I'd, 511 F.2d 
710 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975). 
S45 [d. at 910. 
346 Aerojet, 511 F.2d at 719-20. 
347 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4457, at 494; see also Motomura, supra note 280, at 1029 
n.260. 
348 Aerojet, 511 F.2d at 719-20. 
349 [d. at 719. 
350 [d. at 718. 
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The virtual representation analysis has not achieved wide accep-
tance, but it has survived and carved a niche for itself in other 
circuits,351 even though it has yet to be expressly endorsed by the 
Supreme Court. It has even achieved a grudging acceptance from 
commentators. One of these commentators suggested that virtual 
representation should be applied where there has been a "close 
nonlitigating relationship with a party, participation, apparent ac-
quiescence, and perhaps deliberate maneuvering to avoid the effects 
of the first action, "352 and where "adequate litigation remains the 
central requirement. "353 A Fifth Circuit case may have enhanced the 
chances for survival of the doctrine by limiting it to situations in 
which there is an "express or implied legal relationship in which 
parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who file a 
subsequent suit raising identical issues. "354 Nonetheless, its explicit 
application to the overfiling scenario has not yet occurred. 
Although the Rayonier court cited Aerojet in its discussion,355 the 
court does not seem to have relied upon virtual representation, 
preferring instead to couch its holding in more traditional privity 
language. Two subsequent cases out of the Ninth Circuit, citing the 
Rayonier reference to Aerojet, seemed to depend more on the lat-
ter's logic. In Sierra Club v. Block, an environmental group was 
precluded from litigating an issue that had been decided against two 
of its co-plaintiffs in an earlier administrative action and appeal. 356 
The district judge found an identity of interests in the fact that the 
plaintiffs did not seek recognition of any interests peculiar to them-
selves. Rather, the plaintiffs sought vindication of a public right to 
require Forest Service compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).357 
Similarly, in United States v. Geophysical Corporation of Alaska, 
the Ninth Circuit held that all of the partners to a limited partnership 
were bound by a prior judgment against one of them requiring 
release of geophysical data to the Secretary of the Interior under 
the terms of a permit.358 The Ninth Circuit adopted the accountabil-
ity language of the Fifth Circuit, albeit in less restrictive terms. The 
351 See cases collected in 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4457; see also Motomura, supra note 
280, at 1026-32. 
352 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4457, at 502. 
353 I d. § 4457 (Supp. 1988). 
354 Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 1978). 
355 United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980). 
356 576 F. Supp. 959, 966 (D. Or. 1983). 
357Id. 
358 732 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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court required as a basis for virtual representation only an express 
or implied legal relationship making a party accountable to a non-
party, rather than the collusive relationship required in Aerojet.359 
While the environmental statutes considered in this Article do create 
a legal relationship between the EPA and each state, it is not certain 
that the EPA's authority to rule on the adequacy of state programs, 
to veto permits, and to control certain purse strings would create 
the accountability required by the Ninth Circuit. 
Like the Sierra Club court, a fifth circuit district court applied 
virtual representation, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Al-
exander, a case involving claims under NEP A and the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act.360 The case arose in reaction to the con-
struction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee waterway. Prior litigation by 
an environmental group was held to bar subsequent litigation by 
other such groups as well as by an individual and a railroad. 361 
Because both of the environmental cases that have been based on 
Aerojet have used virtual representation to preclude relitigation of 
NEPA issues by environmental groups, one might ask whether mul-
tiple litigators on the government side can be similarly treated. 
Because citizen suit provisions can have preclusive effect on subse-
quent federal enforcement,362 it seems that state enforcement action 
would be accorded the same effect. The answer depends, however, 
upon whether virtual representation is limited to its narrow factual 
Fifth Circuit application or whether it is given the broader Ninth 
Circuit application. 
If Aerojet is limited to its facts, that is, two agencies of the same 
government acting in collusion to perpetuate litigation, virtual rep-
resentation is not likely to be applied to the overfiling situation. If 
the partnership between the federal and state governments encour-
aged by environmental statutes creates the necessary relationship, 
however, and if the "appropriate and timely" oversight standards of 
the EPA are adhered to by a given state, then the doctrine could 
apply. Virtual representation might well preclude attempts by the 
359 [d. at 697. 
360 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Miss. 1980), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981), on remand, 554 F. 
Supp. 451 (N.D. Miss. 1982). 
361 [d. at 749. 
362 Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part II, 14 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10081-82 (Feb. 1984); see also United States v. IT!' Rayonier, 
Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 
Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977». 
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EPA to overfile if the EPA is merely dissatisfied with the result 
achieved by the state. The degree of independence exercised by a 
given state in any given case might be a controlling fact in the 
analysis. Thus, the EPA's enforcement authority could actually be 
enhanced by states whose enforcement practices deviate regularly 
from the EPA's efforts to standardize penalties, because the EPA's 
ability to overfile would be less subject to challenge. 
V. FEDERAL ISSUES 
A. Full Faith and Credit 
Although it was stated earlier that res judicata and collateral 
estoppel were creations of judges and the common law, in one rele-
vant situation they have a statutory basis: when a federal court must 
decide the effect to be given a prior state court decision. In this 
situation, Congress has spoken through the full faith and credit 
statute,363 which requires federal courts to give state judicial pro-
ceedings the same full faith and credit as they would enjoy in that 
state's courts. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the full faith and 
credit statute as a congressional requirement that all federal courts 
give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that the 
courts of that state would give to it,364 and no more. 365 In most cases, 
though, the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel are the same 
in both jurisdictions.366 Thus, in the overfiling situation, the appli-
cation of res judicata or collateral estoppel has the explicit command 
of Congress over and above the rationale of the common law. 367 The 
Supreme Court has even seized upon full faith and credit as an 
additional philosophical justification for preclusion. The Court has 
noted that the preclusion doctrines promote "the comity between 
363 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
364 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980). 
365 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); see 
also Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75,81 (1984). 
366 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4469, at 659. 
367 This is true in the overfiling situation because it presumes that the state action will be 
the first to reach final judgment and thus be entitled to preclusive effect. At the same time, 
states must also follow federal rules in determining the effect to be given to final federal 
judgments, although not because of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, 
supra note 174, § 87. This was a major issue in Aerojet-General Corporation v. Kirk, previ-
ously discussed. 318 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970), a/I'd sub nom. Aerojet-General Corp. v. 
Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972). See supra text 
accompanying note 340. 
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state and federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of 
the federal system. "368 
The statute originates in the full faith and credit provision of 
article IV, section 1, of the Constitution.369 That provision requires 
each state to give full faith and credit to the acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of every other state and gives Congress the 
power to enact enabling legislation. 370 When Congress enacted the 
enabling statute in 1790,371 it went beyond the Constitution and 
extended the full faith and credit requirements to federal courts as 
well as state courts. 372 
The statutory basis for full faith and credit, when that requirement 
is applied to federal courts, opens the door for the argument that a 
specific subsequent statute either explicitly or impliedly repeals the 
full faith and credit requirement. There is no explicit general rejec-
tion of res judicata and collateral estoppel in the environmental 
statutes covered herein, but there remains the question of whether 
there is an implied partial repeal of the full faith and credit statute 
in any of them. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
this issue in the environmental law context, but, in two recent cases 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Court made clear that repeal by implication was 
"disfavored. "373 The Court went on to say that there are two cate-
gories of repeals by implication: (1) irreconcilable conflict between 
the two acts, or (2) coverage of the entire subject by the later one 
indicating its intention to be a substitute. 374 Under either test, leg-
islative intent to repeal must be "clear and manifest,"375 and more is 
required than just the creation of a federal remedy. 376 
Again using RCRA as a model, either test seems to present an 
insurmountable burden of proof of implied repeal because of the 
ambiguity of the EPA's enforcement authority under Section 3008, 
the explicit authorization of state programs under Section 3006, and 
the absence of any explicit legislative history to provide clarifica-
368 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). 
369 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
370 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.406[1], at 265. 
371 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,462-63 (1982). 
372 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4469, at 662 n.5. 
373 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468 (citing Allen, 449 U.S. at 99). 
374 I d. at 468. 
375Id. 
376 CURRIE, supra note 200, at 328; see also MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.406[1], at 274; 
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 174, § 86 comment d, at 307. 
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tion. 377 The provision that allows the EPA to take enforcement action 
in approved states is not inconsistent with res judicata and collateral 
estoppel because the provision does not necessarily presume that 
the state has already taken enforcement action and because any prior 
state action may not necessarily have res judicata or collateral es-
toppel effect.378 This lack of res judicata and collateral estoppel ef-
fect, even when otherwise appropriate, arguably undercuts the 
states' authority, contrary to the explicit emphasis on their primary 
role in enforcement. 
In one administrative case, these arguments were taken to the 
extreme conclusion that the language of RCRA precluded overfil-
ing.379 It is not necessary to go that far, however, to conclude that 
RCRA leaves intact the statutory full faith and credit requirement 
of giving res judicata and collateral estoppel effect to state court 
decisions where factually applicable. Similar arguments can be made 
for the other statutes, thus disproving any contention that these 
statutes impliedly repeal the full faith and credit statute. Application 
of full faith and credit, however, is of no benefit to defendants in the 
overfiling scenario independent from the remainder of the preclusion 
analysis. 
Full faith and credit is usually mentioned as an independent basis 
for a conclusion reached through the traditional res judicata and 
collateral estoppel analysis. For example, the Supreme Court has 
cited Montana as an example of adherence to full faith and credit 
principles, although the Court did not mention these principles in its 
Montana analysis. 380 The Rayonier case did not discuss full faith and 
credit either, but, in a footnote, the Ninth Circuit indicated that it 
would have reached the same result under such an analysis. 381 In 
contrast other environmental cases that have applied res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, such as Sierra Club, have not explicitly 
mentioned full faith and credit as did Rayonier. These other cases 
can only be read as implicitly rejecting the argument that the statute 
on which the suit is based supersedes the full faith and credit statute. 
377 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6926 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), respectively. 
378 RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
379 See In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-0012, slip op. (EPA May 10, 1985). On an appeal for 
reconsideration, the EPA Administrator dismissed the original complaint by the EPA and 
ruled that the BKK decision would have no precedential effect. Decision on Reconsideration, 
In re BKK Corp., No. IX-84-0012 (RCRA (3008) 84-5), slip op. at 4 (EPA Oct. 23, 1985). 
380 Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6 (1982). 
381 United States v. ITT Rayonier, 627 F.2d 996, 1002 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980). At least one other 
CWA case cited the full faith and credit statute in applying preclusive effect to a state court 
case. See Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
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In addition to providing a statutory basis for preclusion, the full 
faith and credit doctrine incorporates into overfiling cases the state 
rules on preclusion issues generally. For example, a federal court 
must first look to state law to determine whether state 
administrative382 or consent decrees383 constitute final jUdgments. 
The same is true for determining what constitutes a single cause of 
action. 384 In other words, a federal court must look to state law to 
determine if a given judgment meets all the preclusion requirements 
of state law. 385 If so, the appropriate party is then entitled to pre-
clusive effect of that judgment in federal court under the full faith 
and credit principle of federal law. 
While the full faith and credit statute is obviously a powerful tool 
for defendants, its potential can only be realized when the elements 
of res judicata or collateral estoppel are also met. In other words, it 
is of no benefit to a defendant to have a final judgment in state court 
that is entitled to recognition in federal court unless that judgment 
can be used against the federal government. In the overfiling situ-
ation, that use depends, of course, on a finding of privity between 
the state and federal government. While the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that a state's rules determine which state decisions are 
entitled to preclusive effect,386 no case explicitly suggests that state 
rules would govern a privity argument made to a federal judge. 
B. The Federal Government as a Litigant 
In addition to all the issues that are relevant to preclusion analysis 
generally, such as causes of action, final judgment, privity, and full 
faith and credit, the mere presence of the federal government as a 
litigant might also affect the final analysis. Because the overfiling 
scenario always has the federal EPA as the named plaintiff in the 
second suit, one should consider whether exceptions are available to 
the EPA. 
In Montana, the Supreme Court added one final step to the pre-
clusion analysis. In addition to privity, it asked whether the partic-
ular circumstances of the case justified an exception to the general 
principles of estoppel. 387 The Court went on to list three specific 
382 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-84. 
383 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 720-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
908 (1975). 
384 Migra v. Warren City School Dist, Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 87 (1984). 
385 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1980). 
386 Migra, 465 U.S. at 87. 
387 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155, 162 (1979). 
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areas that might warrant exceptions: (1) cases involving issues of 
law arising in successive actions involving unrelated subject matter; 
(2) cases involving rights of litigants who properly invoked federal 
district court jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and who 
were then involuntarily compelled to accept a state court determi-
nation of those claims; and (3) cases involving unfairness or inade-
quacy in state court procedures. 388 
The first exception, involving unmixed questions of law, has given 
the Court some trouble. In Montana, the exception was said to 
apply to "issues of law [that] arise in successive actions involving 
unrelated subject matter. "389 In such circumstances, stare decisis, 
rather than collateral estoppel, is generally said to be the applicable 
doctrine. 39o The Court conceded that its seminal case on the subject 
was "not very illuminating," its underlying purpose was "far from 
clear," and its application was uncertain, while at the same time 
acknowledging that "the exception is generally recognized."391 In 
practice, though, the Court has had more difficulty explaining the 
exception than in finding it inapplicable, as it did in Montana. 392 In 
any event, this exception is unlikely to be arguable in the typical 
overfiling scenario based on inadequate state action because the facts 
are likely to be identical in both cases. 
The second exception, relating to constitutional issues raised by 
the party facing preclusion, is also unlikely to arise in the typical 
overfiling case because it is difficult to conceive of a constitutional 
defense the EPA might have to preclusion. If the state case were to 
turn on a constitutional issue, however, and if preclusion of the EPA 
by that case was otherwise appropriate, the EPA could argue that 
it had not freely submitted this question to a determination in the 
state court. The outcome will depend, as it did in Montana, on 
whether the EPA controlled the state action. 393 
388 Id. at 163-64. The Court has since discussed these three exceptions in two unanimous 
holdings: United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (announcing a seemingly broad 
prohibition on the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in a case involving immigration 
law); United States v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (approving the application of 
mutual defensive collateral estoppel against the EPA in a case involving use of private 
contractors to conduct inspections under the CAA). 
389 440 U.S. at 162. 
390 MOORE, supra note 160, ~ 0.442[1], at 749. 
391 Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 170 n.3, 171-72. 
392 See id. at 172-73; see also Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: 
Institutional Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1306 (1983) 
(suggesting that separating fact from law may be an unattainable goal). 
393 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1979). 
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Finally, the Court has recognized that "redetermination of issues 
is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, 
or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation. "394 This excep-
tion has found its primary application in the civil rights area. Even 
there, however, it is a minority position. 395 In any event, because 
the states have equivalent or more stringent programs that operate 
in lieu of the CWA, SDWA, CAA, and RCRA, factual circumstances 
revealing an open hostility to vindication of federal environmental 
laws and a systematic state court refusal to enforce them are not 
likely. No environmental case has suggested such a possibility. 
In addition to the three general exceptions, the Supreme Court 
also allows the federal government to argue that it is "a unique 
litigant with special responsibilities and concerns that justify ex-
empting it from the preclusive effect of a decision rendered against 
it in a prior case."396 For example, in Mendoza the government had 
previously litigated and lost the key issue with other plaintiffs. 397 
Because the new plaintiff was not a party to the prior suit, it sought 
to assert nonmutuaP98 offensive collateral estoppel to preclude reli-
tigation of the same issue decided against the government in the 
prior suit. For two reasons, the Court agreed that the special status 
of the government entitled it to an exemption for issues such as 
those involved in the case. 399 Most importantly, nonmutual collateral 
estoppel would force the Solicitor General to appeal many more cases 
lost by the government to avoid their preclusive effect, contrary to 
the goal of reducing unnecessary litigation. 40o Moreover, the doctrine 
would prevent development of the law in different circuits because 
the law would be frozen in the first circuit court to decide the issue. 401 
In light of the important public questions regularly litigated by the 
government and the importance of "percolation" in the circuits, the 
Court felt that allowing the first circuit court to hear an issue to 
settle it for all the circuits would be intolerable. 402 
394Id. at 164 n.l1. 
395 Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. 
L. REV. 610, 611-12 (1978). 
396 Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence Precluding Government Relitigation in 
the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1986). 
397 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). 
398 See supra note 277 for a discussion of mutuality. 
399 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162. 
400 Id. at 161; see also Levin and Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States 
Government, 70 IOWA L. REV. 113, 119 (1984). 
401 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160. 
402 Note, supra note 396, at 849-50. 
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Mendoza represents the first generally recognized exception lim-
iting the use of collateral estoppel against the United States.403 
Although the Court limited its holding to offensive use, some com-
mentators regard the decision as a blanket exemption from nonmu-
tual collateral estoppel for the United States. 404 In the same term, 
though, the Court showed it had no fundamental problem with the 
use of collateral estoppel against the United States by allowing 
defensive use in a mutual setting in contrast to the offensive use in 
the nonmutual setting of Mendoza. 
In Stauffer Chemical Company v. EPA,405 the EPA had previ-
ously litigated and lost in the Tenth Circuit the issue of whether 
contractors were "authorized representatives" for the purpose of 
performing inspections under the CAA.406 When the EPA sought to 
litigate the same issue against the same defendant in the Sixth 
Circuit, which had not previously addressed the issue, that court, in 
a split decision, applied collateral estoppel,407 and was upheld by the 
Supreme Court.408 The Court again examined the unique issues pre-
sented by the presence of the federal government as a litigant, but 
found that the problems of Mendoza were not present in the different 
setting. 
The concerns about unnecessary appeals were absent in the Stauf-
fer setting because the requirement of mutuality meant that the 
government need not appeal to preserve the issue against other 
defendants.409 Failure to appeal would bind the government to that 
issue only in subsequent suits with the same defendant, and then 
only in circuits that had not previously taken a different stand on 
the issue. The Stauffer Court saw preclusion of issues against a 
single defendant as a minor imposition on the special role of the 
United States as a litigant. 410 Therefore, the presence of the federal 
government in the setting of Stauffer did not justify an exemption 
to the otherwise applicable rule of collateral estoppel. To relitigate 
403 Baynard, Supreme Court Limits Use of Collateral Estoppel Against the United States, 
16 NAT. RESOURCES L. NEWSL. 2 (1984). 
404 See Note, supra note 396, at 879 n.14. 
405 Stauffer Chern. Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981). 
406 [d. at 1077. 
407 Collateral estoppel was the appropriate doctrine, rather than res judicata, because the 
causes of action were different. The causes of action were different because they were derived 
from events at two different Stauffer plants, even though the litigants were the same. 
408 United States v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984). 
409 [d. at 173. 
410 [d. 
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the issue in another circuit, the government need only pick a differ-
ent defendant. 411 
Giving Stauffer and Mendoza their broadest reading, the use of 
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the United States, either of-
fensive or defensive, is presumably prohibited, while the use of 
mutual collateral estoppel against the United States, either offensive 
or defensive, is presumably permitted.412 Whatever the value of 
percolation and other unique benefits of litigation by the federal 
government, they are outweighed by the unfairness inherent in 
repeatedly litigating the same issue over and over with the same 
defendant, an unfairness eliminated by res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. In Montana, the Court also recognized that this same 
unfairness is present when the first case is brought by the federal 
government's surrogate. 413 Thus stated, these principles can now be 
applied to the overfiling of a prior state enforcement action by the 
EPA. 
These three Supreme Court cases support the application of issue 
and claim preclusion in the overfiling situation because that scenario 
has mutuality as a necessary element whenever there is a finding of 
privity between the federal government and the state. Mutuality 
follows from the assumption that preclusion will be asserted by a 
party to both suits, the defendant, against a party to both suits, the 
state government or its privy, the EPA. Thus, there appears to be 
no general exception to preclusion doctrines available to the govern-
411 [d. at 173 n.6. 
412 At the risk of further complicating the confusing terminology of collateral estoppel, the 
following is offered as an explanation of all the possible permutations in the collateral estoppel 
matrix. For the sake of providing as much simplicity as possible, it will be presumed that 
there are only two parties to the first cause of action, P (plaintiff) and D (defendant). The 
new party in the non-mutual situation will be referred to as X. It will also be assumed that, 
in any cause of action, only one party will find it advantageous to assert collateral estoppel. 
Because mutuality requires an identity of parties in both causes of action, and because 
either party to the first cause of action can be aligned as either the plaintiff or defendant in 
the second, there are four possible assertions of mutual collateral estoppel: P can assert it 
against D offensively (if P is again the plaintiff) or defensively (if P is now the defendant). 
Similarly, D can assert it against P offensively (if D is now the plaintiff) or defensively (if D 
is again the defendant). While the addition of a third party in the non-mutual situations might 
seem to mathematically increase the possible number of combinations to eight, there are still 
only four, because collateral estoppel can only be asserted against a party to the first cause 
of action. In other words, neither A nor B can assert non-mutual collateral estoppel against 
X, either offensively or defensively, because X was not a party to the first cause of action. 
Thus, the possible combinations in the non-mutual situation are that X can assert collateral 
estoppel offensively against P or D if X is the plaintiff in the second cause of action, or 
defensively against P or D if X is the defendant in the second cause of action. 
413 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979). 
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ment in the overfiling scenario, and the key issue remains whether 
a given fact pattern leads to a determination of privity. Important 
as well is the fact that the logic of these three cases is consistent 
with that of the Ninth Circuit in Rayonier and may boost its influ-
ence. The EPA has yet to show why it should enjoy a greater 
immunity from preclusion than other elements of the federal gov-
ernment. 
C. Abstention and Stay 
Abstention, like res judicata and collateral estoppel, is a judge-
made doctrine.414 Abstention and stay arguments often occur in con-
junction with res judicata and collateral estoppel because many of 
the same issues arise. A stay of federal court proceedings pending 
the outcome of state proceedings can give the defendant the oppor-
tunity to obtain the final judgment necessary for arguing preclusion 
against the federal government. 415 Abstention, the decision by a 
district court to decline or postpone the exercise of jurisdiction, 416 is 
the ultimate stay.417 Abstention necessarily involves the same ar-
guments, and can achieve the same result, as res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel without the difficulty of proving privity. 418 
The power to stay proceedings is discretionary and "is incidental 
to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the 
414 See Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 
1108 (1985); Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 71 (1984). 
415 See, e.g., Menzel v. County Util. Corp., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1126 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
In this case, which arose under the CWA, the district judge ruled that the plaintiffs in the 
federal case, Menzel and other citizens of the city of Virginia Beach, were in fact the same 
party as the Commonwealth of Virginia in the state case under the doctrine of parens patriae. 
After first ruling that he would be bound under the full faith and credit doctrine to the state 
court's interpretation of a state-issued NPDES permit, the judge elected to stay the federal 
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal of the state judgment to the state supreme 
court. Id. at 1130. 
416 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). 
417 United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 748 (D. Del. 1981). 
Abstention does not always result in dismissal. See infra note 484 and accompanying text. 
In some situations, it only results in a stay pending the outcome of state proceedings. Thus, 
it is the rationale for the action rather than the action taken by court which identifies 
abstention. 
418 Note that where privity can be proven, though, it presents the opportunity to argue that 
the federal court should refrain under the doctrine of comity. Under the doctrine of comity, a 
federal court may decline to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction to prevent "unseemly" conflicts 
between state and federal courts when there is a suit pending in state court between the 
same parties. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 10(1), at 51-52 (1960); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 528 (1960 
& Supp. 1988). 
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cases in its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 
counsel and for litigants. "419 These basic principles have not been 
altered by environmental law.420 It would probably be an abuse of 
discretion, however, to grant a stay for the mere fact that the same 
issue of law is under consideration in a parallel forum,421 in other 
words, for the mere fact that there is an overfiling. To meet the 
evidentiary burden necessary to convince a judge to exercise the 
court's discretionary power, the proponent of a stay must make out 
a clear case for hardship or inequity.422 One way of meeting this 
burden might be to show a close relationship between the plaintiffs 
in both suits. Because proof of a close relationship is also likely to 
be used to prove control of the state by the EPA and thus privity 
between them, the requirement to argue privity between the EPA 
and state might not be completely avoided by seeking abstention in 
lieu of preclusion. In order to get a stay, a proponent in federal court 
will have to argue successfully many of the same points that would 
otherwise be required for preclusion. 423 To understand a proponent's 
chance for success, one must understand the philosophical underpin-
nings of abstention. 
Although jurisdiction of federal courts is ordinarily a matter for 
Congress, the Supreme Court has justified abstention at various 
times on the broad remedial discretion of a court at equity, on comity, 
and, more recently, on concerns for federalism. 424 This last justifi-
cation is particularly intriguing in the environmental law context 
because each of the statutes covered in this Article, except 
CERCLA, contains a prefatory assertion of the primary responsi-
419 Ohio Envtl. Council v. United States Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 
393,396 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,254-55 (1936)). 
420 See Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396. 
421 See id. 
422 The Supreme Court has described the evidentiary burden and prospects for success of 
the proponent of a stay as follows: 
[T}he suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being 
required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he 
prays will work damage to someone else. Only in rare circumstances will a litigant 
in one be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law 
that will define the rights of both. 
Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 249, 255 (1936). 
423 United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1700 
(N.D. Iowa 1984). 
424 See Wells, supra note 414, at 1108-11. One commentator has argued that judges have 
no inherent or legislated authority to make such doctrine. Thus, abstention is "a judicial 
usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of separation of powers." 
Redish, supra note 414, at 76. The Supreme Court, however, has not acknowledged such a 
limitation. 
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bilities of the states. 425 Whether these provisions are merely a sop 
to the states, or are in fact a true expression of federalism, remains 
to be seen. The federalism argument has yet to be made successfully 
in this context and, at least for now, the independent enforcement 
authority of the federal government seems to outweigh concerns for 
federalism. 426 
Unlike its two preclusion companions, abstention does not date 
from ancient Roman or Germanic law but rather from the United 
States judiciary of 1941. 427 Because of its recent heritage and gaps 
in its development, abstention is not as well-settled as the other 
doctrines and is subject to significant clarification with each new 
Supreme Court case. One thing is clear, though: abstention "is an 
extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court 
to adjudicate a controversy properly before it," and "is the exception, 
not the rule. "428 To understand this extraordinary and narrow ex-
ception, and how it might be applied to overfiling, one must examine 
its present manifestations. 
Currently, there appear to be three distinct types of abstention. 
Each type is known by the seminal case for each situation:429 
Pullman430 abstention, Burford431 abstention, and Younger432 ab-
stention. In addition, there is another doctrine usually discussed in 
the same context called the Colorado River doctrine, also named for 
its seminal case. 433 According to the Supreme Court, the Colorado 
River doctrine is not an abstention doctrine, but involves consider-
ations of wise judicial administration. 434 This doctrine can result in 
a dismissal as well as a stay, however, when applicable. 435 
425 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3000g-2, 6901(a)(4), 7401(a)(3) (1982). 
426 Lehigh, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1700. 
42717A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
§ 4241, at 429-30 (1978 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter 17A WRIGHTJ. 
428 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (quoting 
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)). 
429 See generally 17A WRIGHT, supra note 427, § 4241; see also Wells, supra note 414, at 
1108. The Supreme Court has cautioned that these are not rigid pigeonholes into which the 
cases must fit. Nevertheless, the Court itself uses these classifications. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1526 n.9 (1987). 
420 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
421 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
422 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
433 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
434 [d. at 817. 
435 17A WRIGHT, supra note 427, § 4247. These authors also point out, though, that the 
distinction between a stay and a dismissal is artificial. A stay that allows a parallel state 
proceeding to determine an issue has the practical effect of a dismissal of the federal proceeding 
because of res judicata and collateral estoppel. [d. The Supreme Court has noted that a stay 
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1. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company 
Abstention under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,436 
the oldest of the four doctrines, permits a federal district court to 
avoid deciding sensitive constitutional questions by allowing time for 
a state court to first decide unsettled state law issues that might 
moot the constitutional issues. 437 The requirement for unsettled state 
law issues can frequently be met in the environmental context be-
cause Congress routinely amends the statutes, thus requiring revi-
sion of state plans and reapproval by the EPA. As a result, the 
system ensures a steady supply of fresh state law to be interpreted. 
Because abstention does not require identical proceedings in state 
court between the same parties, the parallel state proceedings in 
the overfiling scenario, if they have not yet reached final judgment, 
should suffice as the forum for deciding the unsettled state law 
questions. 
The additional requirement for sensitive constitutional questions 
is more difficult to find. There is one overfiling case, however, where 
a defendant succeeded in obtaining a stay. United States v. Interlake, 
Inc. is a CAA case in which the defendant was charged in identical 
state and federal actions with violating a rule of the Illinois Pollution 
Control Board. 438 This rule was a part of the state implementation 
plan relating to emission control devices on coke oven facilities. 439 
The federal judge first held that the rule could be challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague and as a denial of due process. 440 The judge 
then granted a stay pending the outcome of the state case to see if 
the state case would result in an interpretation of the rule that would 
avoid the necessity of addressing the constitutional question in fed-
eral court. 441 
United States v. Congoleum Corporation, a later case, criticized 
the Interlake decision and expressly refused to follow it.442 Like 
Interlake, Congoleum was a CAA case, with similar facts. Congo-
leum involved a defendant's allegations that a rule of the Pennsyl-
vania Administrative Code was unconstitutionally vague and viola-
is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal. See Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). 
436 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
437 [d. at 500; United States v. Congoleum Corp., 635 F. Supp. 174, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
438 429 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
439 [d. at 195. 
440 [d. at 197-98. 
441 [d. at 199. 
442 635 F. Supp. 174, 177 n.4 (1986). 
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tive of due process and equal protection.443 The court refused to 
abstain, holding that it was appropriate for a federal court to address 
these issues because, once a SIP is approved by a state, it becomes 
federal law, and cannot be changed without the EPA approval. 444 
Another court has also refused to follow Interlake in a case involving 
issues under CWA, but the court in that case seemed skeptical about 
the legitimacy of the alleged constitutional issues.445 As a result, the 
major impediment to the application of Pullman abstention in en-
vironmental cases appears to be the existence of a "sensitive" con-
stitutional question. 
2. Buiford v. Sun Oil Company 
In contrast to Pullman, the next abstention doctrine to be devel-
oped is less likely to apply to an overfiling situation. Although Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Company446 was decided only two years after Pull-
man, it has been cited in fewer Supreme Court cases and is not as 
well developed. 447 Unlike Pullman, it is applicable whether or not 
there is a parallel state proceeding pending,448 it requires dismissal 
rather than just a stay,449 and it is usually reserved for cases involv-
ing complex state regulation of a business that the federal govern-
ment has chosen not to regulate. 450 
Because of this last factor, Buiford abstention presents a partic-
ularly difficult problem of proof under environmental statutes, 
which, by their nature, involve broad federal regulation of industry. 
The one reported environmental case that considered Burford ab-
stention in depth, a CWA case, rejected it because the parameters 
of the state law had been established by comprehensive federal laws 
and regulations. 451 Given the similarity among the enforcement pro-
visions of the statutes considered here, the same arguments should 
work against this type of abstention under the other statutes as well 
as the CWA. 
443 [d. at 176. 
444 [d. at 177, 178 n.4. 
445 United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 746 (D. Del. 1981). 
446 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
447 Wells, supra note 414, at 1115. 
448 Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REV. 59, 75 (1981). 
449 [d. at 64. 
450 [d. at 77; see also United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 746 (D. Del. 1981); 
Wells, supra note 414, at 1115. 
45! Cargill, 508 F. Supp. at 746-47. 
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. 
3. Younger v. Harris 
The final and most recent abstention doctrine is also unlikely to 
arise factually in the environmental setting. Abstention under 
Younger v. Harris452 is only appropriate where "federal jurisdiction 
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal pro-
ceedings, "453 or "when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the 
State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of 
the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the 
States and the National Government. "454 Younger abstention is 
therefore intended for situations where a private defendant is seek-
ing to affect pending state proceedings. Thus, situations in which 
abstention might bar a suit by the United States would be rare.455 
The situations in which it might bar a federal environmental suit are 
even more rare because of concurrent enforcement authority.456 This 
was the point of the only reported environmental case to discuss 
Younger abstention at length: the EPA rather than a private criminal 
defendant will be the party bringing the federal suit in the overfiling 
situation. 457 Other environmental cases that have considered 
Younger have also rejected it because the necessary factors were 
not present. 458 
4. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States 
A doctrine that has met with somewhat more success than ab-
stention in the environmental arena is that of Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States. 459 In Colorado River, there 
were parallel proceedings in state and federal courts to adjudicate 
water rights among federal and private water users.460 A federal 
statute, the McCarren Amendment, had been passed to allow the 
mandatory joinder of the United States in such state actions. 461 The 
452 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
4Ii3 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
454 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1526 (1987). 
465 17A WRIGHT, supra note 427, § 4252, at 203-04 & n.25; cf Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 
816 n.23. 
466 United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D. Del. 1981). 
467 [d. 
468 See United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1700 
(N.D. Iowa 1984); United States v. Chevron, No. EP-80-CA-265, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Tex. 
June 10, 1983). These are both CAA cases. See also United States v. Pennsylvania Envtl. 
Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1276 n.15 (1978) (CWA case). 
469 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
460 [d. at 820. 
461 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982). 
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Supreme Court first examined the three abstention doctrines and 
found them to be inapplicable. 462 But, the Court also announced that, 
apart from considerations of constitutional adjudications and feder-
alism, there were considerations of wise judicial administration that 
could apply to situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of 
concurrent jurisdictions.463 The Court noted that these other situa-
tions were exceptional and considerably more limited than the cir-
cumstances appropriate for abstention,464 but found such a situation 
in the Colorado River facts nonetheless. In effect, the Court held 
that the inherent discretionary power that a court exercises in grant-
ing a stay could also extend to a dismissal or abatement. 465 
According to the Court, the most important factor warranting 
exercise of this discretion to grant a stay was the congressional 
deference to the state system evidenced by the McCarren Act. Less 
important factors cited by the Court included "absence of any sub-
stantial progress in the federal-court litigation; presence in the suit 
of extensive rights governed by state law; the geographical incon-
venience of the federal forum; and the Government's previous will-
ingness to litigate similar suits in state court. "466 A subsequent case 
mentioned two additional factors arguing against a stay. Pursuant 
to this case, a stay would also be appropriate if a federal law would 
determine the decisional rule on the merits, regardless of the forum, 
and if substantial doubt would remain about the existence of an 
adequate state law remedy for the aggrieved party. 467 
Case law provides the best illustration of the application of Colo-
rado River and its importance to overfiling defendants. The one 
environmental case to grant a stay based upon Colorado River's 
principles, and to review thoroughly the abstention doctrines as well, 
was United States v. Cargill, Inc. 468 Cargill operated a chicken pro-
cessing plant in Delaware whose wastewater treatment plant was 
the source of objectionable odors and water pollutants. 469 As a result, 
the state filed two lawsuits: one for violations of the state regulations 
governing the control of odors (odor suit), and another for violation 
462 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,814-17 (1976). 
463 I d. at 818. 
464 Id. at 819. 
465 See United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734, 747 (D. Del. 1981). 
466 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). 
467 See id. at 24, 27. See generally 17A WRIGHT, supra note 427, § 4247 (discussion of 
avoidance of duplicative legislation in federal and state fora). 
468 See Cargill, 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981). 
469Id. at 742. 
276 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:199 
of the CWA National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit (water suit).470 Because the two problems had a 
common source, the state chose to enter into a comprehensive set-
tlement of the odor suit, while holding the water suit in abeyance as 
a "bargaining stick. "471 The state told Cargill that it would settle the 
water suit for a $5000 penalty if the reconstruction of the treatment 
plant resulting from the air suit settlement proved itself after a full 
year's operation. 472 
After the entry of the order in the settlement, Cargill complied 
with its terms, spent $342,000 in remedial action, and received a 
construction perinit to modify the treatment plant at an additional 
cost of $1.5 million.473 At this point, however, the EPA also filed suit 
for violations of the NPDES permit, in spite of the fact that they 
had participated in the settlement. The EPA sought an injunction 
and a civil penalty of $10,000 per day for past violations.474 The EPA 
took this action over the objection of the Delaware Department of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Control primarily because of 
dissatisfaction with the proposed settlement of the water suit for 
$5000. 475 The EPA was dissatisfied because the EPA settlement 
policy would have calculated a "proper" penalty at $405,000.476 As a 
result, Cargill gave notice that it would be forced to stop work on 
the abatement program, out of fear that this program might be 
inconsistent with any injunctive relief granted in the federal case.477 
Cargill then sought a stay or dismissal of the federal action on 
abstention grounds, but did not argue res judicata or collateral es-
toppel. 478 The judge rejected all the abstention doctrines, and then 
looked to see if the "exceptional circumstances" of the Colorado 
River doctrine were present.479 In balancing all of the factors, the 
judge determined that a stay pending the fulfillment of the state 
settlement was appropriate, noting that the EPA might also be 
collaterally estopped by the finalization of the state judgment. 480 
Weighing most heavily in this decision, among a total of seven factors 
47°Id. at 743. 
471 Id. at 744. 
472Id. 
473 See id. 
474Id. 
475 See id. at 745. 
476Id. at 745. 
477Id. at 744-45. 
478 See id. at 737, 745. 
479 See id. at 745--51. 
480 See id. at 750--51 & n.56. 
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favoring a stay, was the fact that the EPA had brought Cargill's 
construction efforts under the state agreement to a halt by seeking 
injunctive relief. 481 The halt in the abatement program actually 
thwarted the principal goal of the CWA-the prevention of water 
pollution. 482 Among the eight unavailing factors cited by the court 
as weighing against a stay, the two carrying the most weight were 
the fact that the EPA was not a party to the state litigation and was 
seeking a different penalty, and the fact that the EPA had an interest 
in promoting consistency with its uniform penalty policy. 483 
Subsequent environmental cases, all under the CAA, have refused 
to apply Colorado River. In United States v. SCM Corp., the court 
held that a prior administrative consent decree with the state did 
not fulfill the requirement for parallel state court proceedings as an 
adequate vehicle for the resolution of the same claim.484 An informal 
agreement with the state has likewise been held inadequate. 485 In 
481Id. at 749. 
482Id. Those factors cited as favoring a settlement were: 
(a) the avoidance of federal/state friction, (b) the [state'sJ greater familiarity ... with 
the factual background of the case, (c) the state's interest in the enforcement of its 
air pollution laws and regulation, (d) the presence of parallel state litigation and the 
existence of adequate statutory and regulatory authority at the state level to protect 
the public interest, (e) the need to conserve judicial resources, (f) congressional 
intent that primary responsibility for enforcement of the NPDES program rest with 
the state, and (g) the fact that, as a practical matter, the United States by seeking 
injunctive relief ... has brought Cargill's construction efforts to a halt and is thus 
thwarting the principal goal of the [CWAJ-the prevention of water pollution. 
Id. Reliance on this last factor was curious, in light of the judge's rejection of a Younger-type 
abstention because of the "remote possibility that the remedy imposed in the federal action 
will be inconsistent with the state-imposed remedy." Id. at 747. 
483 See id. at 750. Those factors cited by the court as weighing against a stay were 
Id. 
(a) this Court's heavy obligation to exercise the jurisdiction granted it, (b) the fact 
that, as a practical matter, the injunctive relief sought by EPA does not differ from 
that sought by the state and agreed to by Cargill and hence, there does not appear 
to be a serious possibility of conflicting obligations being placed upon Cargill, (c) the 
fact that there are no enforceable requirements that Cargill install pollution control 
equipment, (d) congressional intent that there be some cases where dual state/federal 
enforcement actions be brought, (e) the congressional grant of discretion to the 
Administrator as to when such suits should be brought, (f) the EPA's interest in 
overseeing enforcement at the state level and ensuring uniformity, (g) the fact that 
the EPA is not a party to the state litigation and it is seeking a different remedy 
from the one the state will settle for, and (h) the EPA's interest in ensuring that 
adequate and uniform penalties be sought under its penalty policy. 
484 See United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 417-18 (D. Md. 1985). Unfortunately, 
SCM Corp. does not mention Cargill. In failing to acknowledge and use the exhaustive and 
logical step-by-step analysis of Cargill, the court missed an opportunity to encourage uniform-
ity in an analytical area that badly needs it. 
485 See United States v. Harford Sands, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Md. 1983) ("a 
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United States v. Lehigh Portland Cement Company, the facts of 
Cargill were distinguished. 486 In Lehigh, the judge held that federal 
efforts would not disturb those of the state but would supplement 
them. 487 Thus, only in Cargill has a defendant in an overfiling situ-
ation actually gotten relief by the Colorado River doctrine. 
It appears, then, that environmental laws do not expressly or 
impliedly rescind the authority of a federal court to abstain, because 
courts continue to consider such authority. As in other areas of the 
law relevant to preclusion, however, the fact patterns where ab-
stention should apply are rare. Nonetheless, if res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are technically inapplicable to a given fact pattern, 
defendants may well find relief in the Colorado River doctrine as 
well as "real" abstention. 
As with Rayonier and BKK, the underlying factor seems to be 
objectively reasonable enforcement action by the state that appears 
to be threatened by subsequent EPA action. It may well be that the 
Cargill decision influenced the subsequent formulation and practice 
of the EPA's "timely and appropriate" overfiling policy as a way of 
promoting initial adequate state response to avoid the risk of pre-
clusion or abstention that accompanies overfiling.488 
VI. CONCLUSION 
General principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are un-
doubtedly applicable to final judgments under state environmental 
statutes, as they would be to any other state judgments. Environ-
mental law contains no explicit or implied blanket repeals of either 
common law res judicata and collateral estoppel principles or statu-
tory full faith and credit principles. Use of such judgments defen-
sively in an overfiling situation is therefore theoretically possible, 
but depends upon a showing of privity between the state agency and 
the EPA. 
The overfiling scenario explored in this Article contains many 
elements favoring a finding of privity between the state and the 
EPA. The language of the CWA, SDWA, CAA, and RCRA fosters 
violation of the federal provisions ... is unaffected by the defendant's cooperation with the 
state"). 
486 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1697, 1700 (1984). 
487 See id.; see also United States v. Chevron, No. EP-80-CA-265, slip op. at 5, 6 (W.D. 
Tex. June 10, 1983) (state court action had not yet reached final judgment and the judge 
denied an abstention motion). 
488 18 WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 4404, at 22. 
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the image of the state as an agent or duly-anointed surrogate of the 
EPA in its enforcement actions. These statutes specifically provide 
for approval of equivalent state programs, which are to be carried 
out by the states in lieu of the federal programs. These state pro-
grams in fact become the federal enforcement programs, displacing 
those previously promulgated by the EPA. Permitting actions taken 
by the states then have the same force and effect as those taken 
previously under the federal programs. 
Standing against this evidence of the state and federal govern-
ments acting as alternate enforcers of a single statutory scheme is 
the fact that every statute gives the EPA continuing enforcement 
authority in approved states, without any explicit limitation on its 
power. If each statute's reference to congressional intent to give 
states primary enforcement responsibility is to be meaningful, how-
ever, the states must be in a position of strength to negotiate com-
pliance agreements and other settlements with violators. The states 
cannot negotiate from a position of strength if the EPA is always 
free to seek additional fines and more costly remedial actions through 
overfiling. No sane defendant would negotiate a major settlement 
unless there was a strong likelihood that the EPA was also bound 
by the result. The bridge to resolving this dilemma is found in the 
statutory references to "appropriate" state enforcement actions. 
It seems implicit in each statute that Congress intended the states 
to take the lead in enforcement, but expected the EPA to step in 
when a state failed to take enforcement action when action was 
appropriate or failed to seek appropriate remedies. Although the 
EPA's "timely and appropriate" enforcement policy standards are 
said by the agency to be discretionary and not mandatory under the 
Acts, it is more likely that these mandatory standards capture the 
essence of the scheme envisioned by Congress. If Congress did not 
intend the EPA to overfile on objectively reasonable state actions, 
the EPA's ability to overfile is not unfettered-it is limited by the 
objective reasonableness of the prior state action. The determination 
of whether or not there is a statutory mandate for these enforcement 
policy standards will have to wait for a case that addresses squarely 
Whether a judge can substitute his or her own determination of the 
objective reasonableness of a state's action for that of the EPA. 
While the EPA retains the right to take enforcement action in 
approved states after notice, these statutes are silent as to the effect 
of prior state enforcement action. Even a broad interpretation allow-
ing the EPA action regardless of state action is not inconsistent with 
collateral estoppel, which forecloses issues rather than causes of 
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action. The same is not true of res judicata, which would always 
totally preclude the EPA's enforcement authority if authorized by 
the statute. The harshness of the res judicata result might tip the 
balance against a statutory interpretation allowing application of res 
jUdicata under a transactional definition of a cause of action. 
Application of res judicata (but not collateral estoppel) in the 
overfiling scenario will not be possible as long as the Supreme Court 
adheres to a literal interpretation of "party" for delineating a single 
cause of action as it did in Montana (or as the Ninth Circuit did in 
Rayonier). There may be no good theoretical reason why a privy 
can be treated as a party against whom either preclusion doctrine 
can be asserted but cannot be treated as the same party lor deter-
mining whether res judicata is appropriate rather than collateral 
estoppel, but such seems to be the law. Because the outcome in both 
of these situations would be the same under res jUdicata, however, 
perhaps the issue of res judicata applicability in lieu of collateral 
estoppel has not been settled. 
This issue would be squarely before the court if the EPA were to 
prosecute the same defendant as the state, only to seek additional 
penalties, under the same statutory provisions, alleging the same 
facts, and after the state had successfully prosecuted the defendant 
to final judgment. Because the state's prosecution of the defendant 
would have been successful in such a case, all significant issues 
presumably would have been resolved against the defendant and 
collateral estoppel would be of no benefit. Only res judicata, which 
sets up the first prosecution as a bar to any subsequent prosecution, 
would benefit the defendant. Identity of parties would constitute the 
only element necessary to decide that both cases represent the same 
cause of action, -allowing assertion of res jUdicata. Although the 
language of the CAA, CWA, RCRA, and SDWA provides many 
arguments that the EPA and the state are the same party, it is 
unlikely that a court would go so far to restrict federal authority in 
the face of ambiguous statutory language that can be interpreted in 
the EPA's favor and case law giving a literal interpretation of 
"party." 
By contrast, in a collateral estoppel analysis, the EPA's policy of 
overfiling when prior state action has been "untimely or inadequate" 
may enhance the perception of control over the state that would 
justify a finding of privity between the state and the EPA (or that 
the EPA is a nonparty that has already had its day in court under 
a Montana analysis). Inherent in such a system is constant contact 
with the state and continuous effort by the EPA to influence the 
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states to bring the majority of enforcement actions in a way accept-
able to the EPA so that the EPA can conserve its limited resources 
for the most important cases. However commendable such a policy 
may be from a standpoint of efficient use of the EPA resources, it 
may nonetheless have the unforeseen effect of giving defendants the 
use of res judicata and collateral estoppel in subsequent overfiling 
suits. 
Although it has been eight years since Rayonier, the last reported 
successful use of preclusion principles in an overfiling case, the M on-
tana and Stauffer cases suggest that the Ninth Circuit approach is 
closer to that of the Supreme Court than is the EPA's approach of 
unfettered enforcement authority. With the exception of the offen-
sive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the United States, 
the Supreme Court has consistently fostered use of preclusion prin-
ciples since the 1971 Blonder-Tongue case. Lack of similar cases 
subsequent to Rayonier probably indicates judicious use by the EPA 
of its overfiling authority, and the limited number of fact patterns 
where the defendant actually benefits from the application of collat-
eral estoppel. 489 
In addition to the many cases that indicate that the preclusion 
doctrines are favored by the courts, the increasingly more expansive 
definitions of cause of action, final judgment, and privity ensure that 
the EPA's assertion of unfettered enforcement authority will be 
tested again. The principle of full faith and credit ensures that state 
practices will also be a factor in the outcome. If the philosophical 
underpinnings of res judicata and collateral estoppel have any merit, 
such a result is not inherently unwelcome to the judicial system as 
a whole. If such a result is outweighed by society's need to have an 
omnipotent EPA to deal with environmental threats, then statutory 
changes must be sought. 
Determining that res judicata and collateral estoppel are theoret-
ically applicable does not mean that either will actually apply to a 
given situation. As the case law amply demonstrates, the theoretical 
preclusive effect of a final state judgment is of little consolation when 
there is no final state judgment. Prompt action by the EPA when it 
is dissatisfied with state action is all that is necessary to avoid 
489 To expand upon this latter point: because merger and bar are elements of res judicata, 
rather that collateral estoppel, collateral estoppel is useful only to the defendant in subsequent 
litigation with the EPA where the defendant either prevailed against the state or had some 
significant issue decided in its favor. If the state prevailed, collateral estoppel would actually 
benefit the EPA rather that the defendant in subsequent litigation. 
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preclusion. Because of this fact, stay and abstention doctrines in 
federal court may ultimately have more profound effects than res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
If res judicata and collateral estoppel are technically inapplicable 
to a given fact pattern, then the Colorado River doctrine, if not 
abstention and stay in general, is likely to apply. In addition, behind 
the logic of BKK there lurks the possibility that a given statute will 
not only be interpreted to allow preclusion, but also to mandate 
preclusion of the EPA when a state has exercised its "primary 
enforcement authority" in an objectively appropriate fashion. If 
ihere is It safe prediction in all this, it is that Rayonier, Cargill, and 
BKK indicate that a court or administrative tribunal can be expected 
to act to preser-¥e the reasonable results of a state enforcement 
action in the face of apparently unnecessary action by the EPA. 
When the basis for the tribunal's action is abstention, the EPA's 
authority remains intact. The risk to the EPA, however, is that the 
basis might also be res judicata, collateral estoppel, or statutory 
construction. Strict adherence by states to the EPA's overfiling 
policy is thus the best insurance the EPA has against challenges to 
its "unfettered" enforcement authority. 
The most striking feature of res judicata and collateral estoppel is 
the frequency with which the Supreme Court has addressed them 
in recent years. Although the Court has limited the nse of nonmutual 
collateral estoppel against the United States, the Court believes that 
these doctrines serve valuable judicial and societal goals and will 
continue to demand their application. 
While this Article concludes that res judicata and collateral estop-
pel remain applicable to overfiling cases, this analysis was not under-
taken to provide avenues of escape to those who have violated the 
law. Rather, the purpose of this Article is to present a realistic 
expectation of a court's analysis to encourage the most efficient 
enforcement strategy. As a former official of the President's Council 
on Environmental Quality once noted, perhaps somewhat reluc-
tantly, "[e]ven polluters are entitled to certain basic procedural 
rights. "490 
490 Orloff, Buttressing the Traditional Approach to Enforcement of Environmental Require-
ments: Noncompliance Penalties Under the Clean Air Act, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
50029, 50039 (1979). 
